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ATYPICAL PNEUJ\tl0NIA AND AMBIVALENT LAW
AND POLITICS: SARS AND THE RESPONSE TO SARS
IN CHINA
Jacques deLisle
1. INTRODUCTION: SARS, CHINA, AND INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW
AND POLITICS
The"atypical pneumonia" (or jeidian, as it soon came to be called by the
shortened version of its full Chinese name) that erupted in southeastern China in
late 2002, and the responses by the People's Republic of China ("PRC") to the
outbreak, exposed a familiar and worrisome ambivalence in the PRe's
engagement with the outside world and its approach to legal and political change
at home. The disease, which quickly became better known globally (and among
many Chinese as well) by its English acronym SARS (severe acute 'respiratory
syndrome), showed the extensive interdependence among the public health and
economic health of China, its immediate neighbors, and the wider world. The
2002-2003 SARS episode and its aftermath also reOected, and extended, the
Chinese regime's increased (if sometimes reluctant or unintentional)
transparency and amenability to pressures to adhere to international norms,
including legal ones. On the other hand, important aspects of the PRe's initially
secretive response, its reaction to international criticism and calls for
cooperation, and its handling of SARS-related developments in Hong Kong and
Taiwan pointed in a very different direction. While some post-crisis
developments have tended toward greater engagement with international norms
and regimes, the mixed recore! has continued (not least because of lingering
mutual distrust and recrudescent resentments, as the search for lessons from the
SARS outbreak has continued in China and abroad).
Domestically, a parallel paradox does much to explain the disease's course
and a similar ambivalence has characterized China's reactions and responses.
On one side, the SARS episode reOected the increased transparency, openness,
mobility, and decentralization of authority in contemporary Chinese society,
which contributed to the disease's spread as well as to the exposure of its
existence and some aspects of the response. The SARS crisis precipitated
sharply increased calls from many quarters (ranging from top elites to reformist
intellectuals to worried citizens) for legal and political reforms to increase the
free flow of information, government accountability, and government attention,
to ordinary citizens' needs as vital means for protecting public health, the
economy, and even political stability. On the other side, the SARS crisis also
seemed to teach more authoritarian lessons, particularly to the top elite. These
included: the determination to use harsh criminal sanctions to address a wide
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range of disapproved SARS-related behavior (including some that had obvious
public health rationales and others that did not); the satisfaction that, as the crisis
passed, the basic PRC "system" (including some revived seemingly neo-Maoist
methods) worked; and conclusions that stronger conventionally Chinese-style
laws and institutions would have lessened the danger in 2003 and were a key
. means for preventing a recurrence.
To be sure, China's leaders during the SARS crisis are not unique in
experiencing tension between handling a potentially transnational public health
problem primarily at a national level and addressing it through prompt,
extensive international cooperation. China's experience with SARS is hardly sui
generis in being a public health crisis that generated seemingly contradictory
imperatives to "liberal" policies (encouraging accurate reporting, the free flow of
relevant information, etc.) and more authoritarian-seeming emergency control
measures (such as quarantines, other restrictions on mobility, intrusive
monitoring, and sanctions for violating disease containment measures).l
But in contemporary China, such ambivalence is particularly acute or, in
Mao's terms, the contradictions are especially likely to be antagonistic. Given
China's position as the epicenter of SARS (as of many past, and likely future,
mass infectious diseases, including, for instance, various forms of influenza), such
features of Chinese law and politics are matters that the international legal,
political, and public health communi.ties must be prepared to address or
accommodate.
These "contradictions" in law and politics at home and abroad for China in
the SARS crisis are addressed in Parts III through VI of this article. 2 Part III
focuses on the "open" or "cooperative" face of China's engagement with
international pressure and organizations.3 Part IV examines the more "closed"
or "resistant" dimension of that engagement.4 Parts V and VI offer a parallel
analysis of the similarly contradictory "domestic" face of the law and politics of
SARS in China.s Before turning to such matters, Part II provides background
about the emergence of SARS in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan and the global
reaction to it, and draws parallels to the Asian Financial Crisis of the later
1990s.6
II. SARS, CHINA, PERIPHERAL CHINA AND THE WORLD: A EW ASIAN
CONTAGION?
From SARS's appearance in November 2002 through July 5, 2003, when the
1. For further analyses of these issues, see, for example, Jason W. Sapsin et al.. SARS and
Internalianal Legal Preparedness, 77 TEMP. L REV. 155, 158-165 (2004).
2. See infra notes 35-168 and accompanying text for more detailed discussion of these
contradictions.
3. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text for discussion of China's cooperative
engagement.
4. See infra notes 49-86 and accompanying text for analysis of China's resistant engagement.
5. See infra notes 87-168 and accompanying text for discussion of domestic engagement.
6. See infra notes 8-34 and accompanying text for a background of SARS.
I
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World Health Organization ("WHO") declared the outbreak contained, the
disease killed 812 people and infected more than 8,400 people.7 While such
human losses are tragic, and defining an appropriate level of concern over a new
threat to public health is problematic, SARS prompted alarm and reaction
disproportionate to the death and illness it caused, in comparison to other
diseases that have stricken more people in the same period, are no less highly
communicable, or have higher mortality rates.8 To be sure, some of the reaction
derived from an inevitable period of uncertainty about whether the new illness
might be far more catastrophic than it has, in fact, turned out to be. But the
limits of science were only part of the problem.
What made SARS an international crisis-and one that brought great
pressure on the PRC to conform to international standards and demands-was
that SARS could spread from country to country rapidly and potentially·
devastatingly along the pathways created by globalization. Greatly expanded
and jet-speed international mobility of people-many of them traveling because
of the opportunities accorded by global investment and trade-made possible
the quick and unpredictable spread of SARS and the economic and human
harms it could cause.
SARS quickly showed that it could exact a significant short-term economic
toll, and, if unchecked or recurring, a devastating longer term one in the Greater
Chinese region and beyond. The impact of the several thousand SARS cases in
2002-20039 made clear that a serious SARS epidemic could produce costs that
might rival the Asian Financial Crisis of the mid-1990s. 1O Like the financial
system-centered meltdown that spread from Thailand throughout Southeast
Asia and into Northeast Asia in the 1990s, the atypical pneumonia that began in
southeastern China raised the prospect pf a domino effect that could damage
7. Dirk Beveridge, WHO Drops Final Country from SARS List, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jul. 5, 2003, .
2003 WL 58611694: WHO Says SARS Contained but Threat Remains, REUTERS, Jul. 7,2003, available
at hltp://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20030707/449_6230.asp (last visited Aug. 24, 2004); World Health
Organization, Cumulative Numbers of Reported Probable Cases of SARS, at http://who.int/csr/sais!·
country/2003_07_09/enl (last visited Aug. 24, 2004) [hereinafter WHO, Cumulative Numbers].
8. In the PRC alone, for example, over 100,000 people die annually from tuberculosis, and
United Nations data projects that HIV/AIDS will infect ten million people by 2010. Press Release,
UNAIDS, Asian Development Bank, 10 Million More Asians HIV-Infected by 2010 Unless Urgent
Action Taken, Warns New Report (Jul. 8, 2004), available at http://www.unaids.org/EN/other/
functionalities/Search.asp.
9. One published estimate put the potential damage to Asian economies if SARS continued to
September 2003 at nearly $30 billion. SARS Could Cost Asia $28 Billion, UPI, May 29, 2003, LEXIS,
Newsfile Library, UPI File. Hong Kong-based Cathay Pacific reported carrying about one-quarter its
normal load of passengers in mid-May while Singapore airlines had half as many passengers in April
2003 as it had a year earlier. Jane Boyle, Cathay Losing Money Fast, AUST. L. FIN. REV., May 16,
2003, at 62.
10. For estimates of the economic impact of the Asian Financial Crisis and analyses of its origins,
see, for example, Jeffrey A. Winters, Asia and the "Magic" of the Marketplace, 97 CURRENT HISTORY
418,420-24 (Dec. 1998); Jeffrey E. Garten, Lessons for the Next Financial Crisis, 78 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
76, 77-81, (Mar./Apr. 1999); Robert Wade, National Power, Coercive Liberalism, and "Global"
Finance, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ENDURING CONCEPTS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 482-89
(Robert J. Art & Robert Jervis eds., 5th ed. 2000).
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advanced industrial economies.
Some of the immediate impact was far-flung indeed. SARS fears and
WHO-prompted travel bans led to sharp downturns in airline and travel
industries that were still reeling from the aftermath of the September 11 til
terrorist attacks. In Toronto, the most severely affected area outside East Asia,
SARS caused over 30 deaths among over 200 infections. ll It cost Canada tens of
millions of dollars per day in lost economic activity and the prospect of a half-
point drop in its economic growth rate. 12 Although Toronto's problems were not
replicated elsewhere beyond China and the immediately adjacent region, such
developments left national and municipal leaders throughout the developed
world to monitor the trickle of SARS diagnoses in their jurisdictions and worry
that they might find themselves in the shoes of Toronto's mayor, facing dire
economic consequences, railing at the WHO, and desperately trying to convince
the world not to stay away.13
Closer to the epicenter, international buyers, whose orders for clothing,
toys, and electronics keep many of China's industries and Hong Kong's offices
running, and international investors, who keep China's economy growing,
stopped showing up. Multinational corporations had to contemplate what could
happen to their intricate global supply networks if SARS were to disrupt the
manufacturing of a vast range of consumer goods in the factories of Guangdong
or the production of computers in Tqiwan-invested facilities farther north along
China's gold coast. Here too, the dire scenarios did not occur. Commercial
relations muddled through with local agents, the internet, video conferencing,
and the like until the disease began to ebb. International investors merely
paused or perhaps postponed new ventures. The links in the complicated
production chains remained unbroken. But, again, the lesson was clear about
what could have been and what might be if SARS re-erupts.
SARS' immediate economic impact was, of course, greatest in the most
affected areas of China-which included some of China's most economically
dynamic areas such as Beijing, parts of Guangdong, and other industrial and
service sector-oriented coastal regions. In addition to the consequences of
foreigners' and foreign markets' worries, local residents reacted as well.
Although there was soaring demand for surgical masks, rubber gloves,
disinfectants, vinegar (the boiling of which, some rumors claimed, would kill the
pathogen), and train tickets (to escape SARS-stricken Beijing), economic
activity otherwise slowed greatly. In Beijing, and other affected or worried
cities, people stayed home from shopping malls, restaurants, and work.
Excepting the exodus from Beijing, domestic travel fell as people forewent trips
to potentially affected destinations and as local authorities erected roadblocks
11. WHO, Cumulative umbers, supra, note 7.
12. Clifford Krauss, Toronro Mayor Calls for Underscan ding from Businesses and Consumers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at A2l.
13. Susan Carto, Travel Advisory; Toronto Contends with SARS Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 27,
2003, § 5, at 3; Toronro Mayor Rails Againsc WHO Warning, CBC NEWS, Apr. 24, 2003, at
http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/04/23/sars_tor030423.
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against outsiders who might carry the disease. 14
The impact of all these factors was sufficient to drive down national growth
rates appreciably. SARS initially led forecasters to reduce projections for the
PRC's growth rate by about one half of a percentage point for 2003,15 and led
some assessments to conclude that the country's economy shrank during the
peak of the SARS crisis in the second quarter of 2003.16
The harm from the 2003-2004 outbreak proved relatively limited, however,
with foreign investment still up in 2003 substantially over 2002levels,J7 economic
growth still topping seven percent,18 and projections for 2004 and beyond
foreseeing little to no "SARS effect," barring a recurrence of the illness.
Government programs and subsidies helped the recovery of particularly hard-hit
sectors, such as restaurants and hotels. 19
Also in the high impact zone was China's near- or semi-abroad, specifically
Hong Kong and Taiwan-the two highly developed peripheral regions of greater
China. The serious early eruption of the disease and its rise to alarming levels in
Hong Kong and Taiwan made clear that SARS' impact and vectors for global
propagation were especially dense in these two places. From the first case in
March to the time the outbreak wound down in June, Hong Kong reported over
1,700 cases, with nearly three hundred people dying to the illness. In Taiwan,
where the first case occurred in February 2003, the number of infections reached
nearly seven hundred and the number of deaths passed eighty.2o
SARS pushed Hong Kong's shakily recovering economy back to anemic
growth and threatened recession. 21 Unemployment rose22 while trade-
dependent companies' profits fell, and the estimated costs of SARS approached
four to five billion U.S. dollars.23 Taiwan, struggling to emerge from the worst
14. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (discussing travel bans during SARS).
15. Nils Pratley et aI., The Impact: SARS Effects Underline Fragility of Far East Economies, THE
GUARDJAN (London), Apr. 25, 2003, at 19.
16. Keith Bradsher, SARS Ebbs in East Asia, but Financial Recovery is Slow, N.Y. TIMES, May
31,2003, at A8.
17. Salbiah Said, China Says Its Rise Conducive for World Stability, BERNAMA MALAYSIAN
NAT'L NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 14,2003, available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, Bernama National News
Agency - Malaysia File.
18. Chinese Premier Predicts 7 Percent Growth for China Despite SARS, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, June 29, 2003, available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, Deutsche Presse-Agenrur File.
19. See China Announces Package to Help SARS-Hit Hotels, Restaurants, AFX-ASIA, Aug. 5,
2003 (offering tax breaks and other assistance to aid hotels and restaurants), available at LEXIS,
Newsfile Library, AFX-Asia File.
20. See WHO, Cumulative Numbers, supra note 7 (tallying statistics of disease).
21. See David Cohen, War and Disease Are Weighing on Asia, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Apr. 2,
2003 (lowering Hong Kong's growth estimates from 3% to 1.9%-2.7%), available at LEXIS, Newsfile
Library, Business Week Online File; Prately et aI., supra note 15 (lowering Hong Kong's GDP growth
estimates from 305% to 0.5%); Geoffrey A. Fowler, The High Cost of Sick Days, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Apr. 10,2003, at 20 (estimating 6% annual loss in Hong Kong's GDO for duration of SARS crisis).
22. Richard McGregor, Impact of SARS and Lingering Deflation Propel Hong Kong Jobless Rate
to Highest in 30 Years, FIN. TIMES (London), June 18,2003, at 6.
23. Jimmy Cheung, True Cost of SARS Outbreak Could Add Up to $46b. S. CHINA MORNING
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period of economic performance in its recent history, faced SARS-related
setbacks that analysts predicted would shave anywhere from a few tenths to
more than a point and a half from the 2003 growth rate if the outbreak were not
brought fully under control in less than six months, with a relapse into negative
growth during the year's second quarter.24 Schools closed for weeks in Hong
Kong, as they did in Singapore and Beijing. Employees stayed away from their
offices in droves. Shopping areas, public transit, and airports emptied in Hong
Kong, as in Beijing, with those daring to venture out often wearing surgical
masks. All this produced vivid media images that deepened popular fear and
panic.
True, the worst passed relatively quickly in peripheral China, as in the core
PRC areas and abroad, with infection rates troughing, travel advisories lifting,
and life and business returning to normal within several months after the
disease's onset. But the short-run economic damage was real and the prospect of
a return of SARS-and the serious economic consequences that would ensue-
continued to cause jitters more than a year after the initial outbreak. One
mistaken report of infection of a traveler returning to Taiwan from the mainland
received extensive television coverage until the case was quickly disconfirmed in
December 2003.25 A similar pattern ensued in Hong Kong with reports of an
infected traveler followed by negative results of tests on the suspected
individuals.26 A confirmed case in a worker in a SARS lab in Taiwan, like a
handful of similar cases in the PRC, did not trigger great alarm because it did not
lead to large numbers of secondary infections.27 The lack of impact of such
incidents does not, of course, suggest that a larger number of confirmed
infections in the general population would not trigger reactions more akin to
those of 2003.
What made peripheral China especially vulnerable to and skittish about
SARS is more than a simple tale of geographic proximity. The etiology of the
outbreaks and the problems plaguing the response to SARS in Hong Kong and
POST, Aug. 2.2003. at 3.
24. See GDP Growth Could Drop Below 2 Percent if SARS Continues: Official, TAIWAN Eco
NEWS, Apr. 25, 2003 (reporting a 1.56% predicted decrease in Taiwan's economic growth rate),
available at http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20030425/20030425b4.htmJ; Keith Bradsher & Erik
Eckholm, The SARS Epidemic: The Implications: SARS Spreads in Taiwan; WHO Plans Trip There.
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2003, at A7 (reporting a predicted 1% decrease in Taiwan's economy between
April and June 2003); SARS 10 Claim Heavier Toll on Economy: Officials, TAIWAN ECON. NEWS, Apr.
9, 2003 (reporting a predicted 0.1 % decrease in economic growth for 2003), available at
http://www.taiwanheadlines.goy.tw/20030409/20030409b1.html.
25. See Infected Man in Taiwan Has Nm Spread SARS Virus, CHI A DAILY. Dec. 19. 2003
(reporting on efforts to determine if Taiwanese man infected others with SARS). available al
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/19/contenc291615.htm.
26. Klaudia Lee, SARS Test Comes Up Negative, But Palient Remains in Isolation. S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 21.2004, at 3. I
27. China Calls for Strict COl1lrol of SARS Specimens in Labs After Taiwan Case. XINHUA FIN.
NEWS, Dec. 18, 2003, available at LEXIS, ewsfile Library, News, All File; China 10 Ban Below
Standard SARS Labs from Research, ASIA PULSE, Dec. 31, 2003, available al LEXIS, ewsfile Library,
News, All File.
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Taiwan have an economic dimension that goes beyond mere physical adjacency.
The channels for the spread of SARS in these two regions were created by the
economic integration that has underpinned Beijing's agenda of transforming
these "lost" Chinese territories into PRC Special Administrative Regions, and its
broader related aims of economic development through deeper economic
integration with the outside world.
The policies of openness to foreign investment that the PRC undertook
beginning in the late 1970s had some of their greatest and earliest effects in the
Pearl River region and neighboring areas. Investment flowed across the border
from Hong Kong. transforming the British colony into a front office for
manufacturing operations inside China, and a portal between a reforming China
and an outside world that found Hong Kong (with its legal institutions,
developed financial sector, and English language skills) to be a more congenial
place to do business. The PRC and Hong Kong have for years ranked among
each other's top handful of trade and investment partners.28 In the pre-reversion
years, these dense economic ties, and the resulting sense of the PRe's interest in
preserving a thriving Hong Kong, helped make the prospect of the territory's
return to Chinese rule as a Special Administrative Region ("SAR")-and, in
turn, still closer integration with the PRC-conceivable to many in Hong Kong
and their British guardians.29
A broadly similar trajectory of economic integration has been unfolding
between the PRC and Taiwan since the later 1980s. As restrictions on cross-
strait investment and trade were relaxed, Taiwanese capital poured into eastern
and southeastern China. \Vhile the data are clouded by such investments'
politically sensitive and sometimes illegal character, the island republic has
become a top-ranking source of the PRe's foreign direct investment. Both
entities rank among each other's top trading partners. 30 The recent accession of
Taiwan and the PRC to the World Trade Organization ("WTO") augurs further
growth in bilateral economic ties. Jt is widely recognized that Beijing hopes and
expects this burgeoning relationship of asymmetrical economic interdependence
28. See, e.g., Trade and Industry Department, Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, The Mainland of China and Hong Kong Special Adminislrorive Region: Some
Imporlal1f Facrs (noting that trade between PRC and Hong Kong constituted 40.3% of Hong Kong's
global trade in 2001 and that Hong Kong was PRes fourth largest trading partner in 2001), available
ar hrtp://www.tid.gov.hkJenglish/aboutus/publications/factsheetl china2003.html (last updated Sept. 5,
2003) ; Joseph Y.S. Cheng & Zheng Peiyu. Hi-Tech indusrries in Hong Kong and rhe Pearl River Delta.
41 ASIAN SURVEY 584, 585-86 (Jul./Aug. 2001) (analyzing economic cooperation between China's
Pearl River Delta and Hong Kong over two decades).
29. See ge/lerallv Jacques deLisle & Kevin P. Lane, Cooking rhe Rice wirhow Cooking rhe Goose:
The Rule of Law, rhe Bailie over Business and the Ques! for Prosperity in Hong Kong after 1997, in
HONG KONG UNDER CHINESE RULE 31 (Warren 1. Cohen & Li Zhao cds., 1997) (analyzing link
between potential "rule of law" in Hong Kong and maintaining economic prosperity).
30. See US $140 Billion invested in China, TAfPEI TIMES, May 31, 2002, at 18 (reporting amount
invested in China by Taiwanese businesses in 2001); Statistics on National Trade with the Mainland
Area, aI http://www.trade.gov.tw/prc&hk/mo_9203.htm (on file with author); Cal Clark, Growing
Cross-Strait Economic inregratioll, 46 OREIS 753, 757 (Fall 2002) (analyzing increased economic
integration between China and Taiwan).
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to strengthen Taiwanese support for-or acquiescence in-a broad SAR-style
arrangement, and to give the PRC additional leverage with recalcitrant
Taiwanese to accept Beijing's preferred resolution to the "reunification
question. "
With these economic relationships have come vast and frequent flows of
people. These human connections provide pathways for diseases to spread
rapidly from southeastern China to Hong Kong and Taiwan. The PRC-SAR
border is one of the world's busiest controlled frontiers, with hundreds of
thousands of crossings per day. Non-SAR PRC residents cross the border into
Hong Kong as tourists, business people, or laborers, and some stay for extended
periods. Hong Kong-resident managers tend to their factories, and SAR-based
capitalists, to their investments on the mainland side. Hong Kong people head
to Guangdong for recreation or to visit relatives or to work in office jobs.
Affluent SAR residents have second homes and, sometimes, second families on
the PRC side of the border. Having sought bigger or cheaper housing, some
Hong Kongers commute daily from abodes in Guangdong.31
Hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese (over a million by many estimates)
now live relatively permanently in the PRC, primarily as Taiwan-invested
companies' owners, employees, and their dependents. Many return regularly to
Taiwan for business or to see friends and family. Huge numbers of Taiwan-
based Taiwanese travel to the mainland as tourists, business people, or visitors to
their families' old home villages, with the total number of trips counted in the
millions per year. Because bans on direct air links between Taiwan and the
mainland persist, almost all of the cross-strait human traffic flows through the
Hong Kong SAR.32
With these dense connections, it is hardly surprising that SARS extended its
reach from southeastern China to Hong Kong and Taiwan. When the ailment
quickly reached Hong Kong, apparently by means of a PRC-based "super-
spreader" who infected fellow guests at Kowloon's Metropole Hotel, the virus
had followed one of countless available routes. There has been less precise
tracing of, or speculation about, the precise pathway by which SARS reached
Taiwan, but it did so with equal dispatch along one or more of the many routes
across the Strait.
For the wider world, Taiwan and Hong Kong provided examples of what
SARS might wreak in more distant places that were, nonetheless, linked (albeit
less intensively) to an increasingly globalized China. Through their own
exceptionally dense international connections, Hong Kong and Taiwan also
31. See The Home Front, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 28,2002, at 10 (estimating over 200,000
mainland homes owned by Hong Kong people).
32. See Erik Eckholm. Chinese are Tempting Taiwan by Dangling Economic Fruit, N.Y. TIMES.
Jan. 28, 2003, at A4 (discussing Taiwan's restrictions on direct flights to China); Taiwan Authorities
Reject Direct Charter Flights, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Nov. 14, 2m:l2 (noting unsuccessful efforts to establish
direct flights between China and Taiwan), available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200211/14/
eng20021114_106783.shtml ; Zhongguo Wang, Direct Flights Narrow Straits, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 7,
2003, al http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/52962.htm (concerning first direct charter flights
between China and Taiwan during Chinese New Year).
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provided additional and especially potent pathways for the pathogen's spread.
Indeed, many of the infections outside the immediate Chinese region and
perhaps some of the infections in the core PRC areas were thought likely to have
come through or from Taiwan or Hong Kong.
III. WHO'S THAT KNOCKING ON THE (OPEN) DOOR
Not surprisingly, a threatened-feeling world responded sharply in 2002-
2003, and grew jittery with each report-ultimately confirmed or not-of a new
case in late 2003-2004, and did so in ways familiar from other recent dangers
emanating from Asia. As with the financial crisis that spawned the phrase
"Asian Contagion," the first several months of SARS prompted powerful,
developed states and international organizations to press governments in the
most affected areas to undertake prompt remedial measures to address
perceived institutional failures. As in the earlier economic crisis, these outside
advocates of change considered themselves justified in pressing their agendas
because they saw their own vital national interests and welfare at risk.
SARS generated calls for China to cooperate more fully with foreign and
international health authorities, to remove political barriers to Taiwan's
engagement with the WHO, and to make the PRC's public health and other
relevant institutions and processes more transparent and effective.33 In
significant part, the Chinese response heeded, or at least paralleled, such
prescriptions from abroad. After an initial rough patch, much of the PRC's
response could be described as cooperative, transparent, and proactive. At a
pivotal meeting on April 17, 2003, the Politburo Standing Committee proclaimed
a commitment to gathering and sharing accurate information, ordering
"accurate, timely and honest reporting" .of SARS cases.34 A few weeks earlier,
WHO teams were granted access, albeit belatedly, to SARS-stricken Beijing.
WHO teams also gained access to SARS-epicenter Guangdong and other sites in
China. Reports from PRC public health circles indicated that PRC scientists
were directed to address the WHO's questions and concerns.
The general (though not unmixed) tone of outsiders dealing with China
shifted from one of imposing pressure to one of praising and further encouraging
cooperation.35 The WHO and foreign governments generally welcomed China's
33. See Lawrence K. Altman & Keith Bradsher, China Bars WHO Experts from Origin Site of
l/lness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2003, at A7 (discussing PRC's denial of WHO experts' access to
Guangdong province); SARS-An Opportunity: China Reshuffles Public Health, Disease Prevention
System, PEOPLE'S DAILY (China), May 19, 2003 (discussing WHO criticism of PRC's public health
system and changes implemented by PRC), available at http://english.people.com.cn/200305/03/
print20330503_116188.htmJ; Donald G. McNeil Jr., SARS Furor Heightens Taiwan-China Rift, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 2003, at A8 (discussing the intensified tensions between the PRC and Taiwan
following the PRC's attempt to hide its SARS epidemic from the international community).
34. Matthew Forney, Silent for Too Long, TIME, Apr. 28, 2003, at 15.
35. See SARS Lessons Scill Not Learned in Fight Againsc Bird Flue, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Jan. 25, 2004, at 10 (suggesting that the international community pressure the Chinese government
regarding SARS); China Claims Milestone Victory in Battle AgaiJ1St SARS, XINHUA, June 25, 2003
(quoting WHO official on China's performance from April through the lifting of the WHO travel
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increased efforts at collaboration, with many of the remaining complaints
asserting incompetence rather than recalcitrance.36
Chinese officials, including the then-newly-designated SARS czar, Vice
Premier Wu Yi, stressed the importance of cooperation with Asian states, the
WHO, and others to address the problem.37 China accepted advice and
assistance from Italy in training local government officials and disease control
and prevention-center workers in epidemiology, law, surveillance, reporting, and
safe handling of samples.38 Hong Kong and PRC public health officials moved
on to WHO posts, providing a stronger personal and personnel basis for
cooperation.39
More concretely, Chinese authorities took visible and domestically
controversial (though, it later turned out, quite limited) steps to answer
international calls to stem the likely vectors of contagion, including inadequately
screened travelers and the consumption of civet cats and other wild animals that
international experts identified as the likely pathways of the disease. After some
delay, temperature screeners were dispatched to transportation points and
quarantines were imposed or at least attempted. Despite the economic hardship
to game farmers and the discontent of restaurant patrons, local authorities issued
regulations banning the eating of such dishes and threatening fines for selling or
allowing the release of such animals. In Guangdong, Shanghai and elsewhere,
local health officials monitored and enforced quarantines of legally held stocks,
while law enforcement authorities cracked down on the illegal trade in wild
animals and confiscated tens of thousands of animals. China quietly acquiesced
in other countries' banning the import of the suspected animals from PRC
sources.40
advisory for Beijing, the last listed locale), available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, Xinhua General
News Service File.
36. See Leu Siew Ying et aI., Mandate to Co-operate on SARS After Signaling a Shift in Policy, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 3, 2002, at 1 (reporting reaction of WHO to China's increased
cooperation).
37. See Wu Yi Shares PRes Experience on SARS Fight with APEC Health Ministers, WORLD
NEWS CONNECTION, June 28, 2003 (discussing Health Minister's statement about importance of
international cooperation in containing SARS). available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, News, All File;
China Calls for Global Cooperation against SARS, XINHUA, June 4, 2003 (reporting on PRC's call for
international cooperation to eradicate SARS), available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, Xinhua General
News Service File; Qian Tong et aI., PRC Vice Health Minister Gao Qiang Addresses ASEAN+3
Meeting on SARS, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, June 3, 2003 (reporting that PRC Health Minister's
recommendation for increased international cooperation to fight SARS), available at LEXIS, Newsfile
Library, Xinhua General News Service File.
38. Italy Helps China Train Local Officials Against SARS, XINHUA, Dec. 15, 2003, available at
LEXIS. Newsfile Library, Xinhua General News Service File.
39. See, e.g., Mary Ann Benitez & Patsy Moy. Tmck Driver's Advice Made Health Chief Take
WHO Job, S. CHINA MORNI G POST, Aug. 19,2003, at 1 (reporting Hong Kong Director of Health's
acceptance of position at WHO).
40. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Civet Cat Farmers Fighting to Save Their Own Hides, L.A. TIMES,
June 16, 2003, at 3 (discussing China's ban on consumption of particular animals); China's Guangdong
Province Confiscates Thousands of Wild Animals, AGENCE FRA CE PRESSE, June 5, 2003 (discussing
ban on consumption, trade. and use of wild animals), available at 2003 WL 69200094; Yi Hu. Trade
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What do these internationally transparent, cooperative, and conforming
elements in China's response to foreign demands and international regimes
during the SARS crisis of 2002-2003 tell us about the foundations and, therefore,
the durability and significance of this face of the PRC's behavior?
First, to some extent, it shows China responding to an international regime
that had the power to coerce. True, the WHO is no International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") or WTO. It does not have the IMF's clear and demanding agenda
for fundamental reform in targeted countries, long-term and high-level support
from key states, and leverage as a provider or gatekeeper of resources
desperately needed by an afflicted state. Nor does the WHO have the global
trading body's extensive and legitimate authority to make definitive
determinations of internationally legally permissible and impermissible behavior
in the relevant field, and to mobilize or impede the imposition of painful
sanctions by other states against targeted states.
As a narrow legal matter, the WHO lacked the authority to require member
countries to take steps to contain SARS. Member states' obligations to report
outbreaks extended only to a small number of listed diseases that, not
surprisingly, did not include the hitherto unknown ailment SARS. The guiding
principles for the WHO rules were to ensure the maximum security against the
international spread of diseases with a minimum interference with world traffic.
Specific rules governing the restrictions that states might place on international
travel focused primarily on seeking to limit states' latitude to impede commerce
and mobility. And the general view of WHO practice had been that it had
leaned toward the "minimum interference" side of its mandate.4l The leader of
the WHO team that investigated the outbreak in Guangdong complained that
the organization needed the right to go into .any country that faced an outbreak,
despite the international legal and political obstacles to giving the WHO such
power.42
But that is only part of the story. The WHO did wield crucial "soft power"
to place a country or part of a country on, or off, a "no go" list and to do so in a
way that carried weight with the international community, both governmental
and nongovernmental. The absence of clear WHO formal authority to do so,
and the lack of precedent, mattered little. The howls from Toronto, the
scramble throughout China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong to get off the WHO travel
Ban Is Lifted But Wildlife Still Off Mainland Menus, S. CHINA MORNlNG POST, July 12, 2003, at 5
(reporting lift of trade ban but continued prohibition on consumption of wild animals).
41. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATlON, WORLD HEALTH REGULATlO S 5 (3d ed. 1995)
(establishing regulations to ensure the maximum security against the international spread of disease
with a minimum interference with world trade); Andy Ho, Why Epidemics Still Surprise Us, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003. at A19 (discussing the ineffectiveness in creating and enforcing a public health
policy appropriate for outbreaks like SARS). See generally DAVJD P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INFECfIOUS DISEASES 65-71 (1999) (examining the effectiveness of international health
regulations).
42. Mary Ann Benitez, Investigator Seeks Unhindered Entry to SARS Countries, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 31, 2003, at 3.
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ban list, and so on, amply illustrated the significance of this power.43
Moreover, and despite criticism that the WHO's de facto travel bans were
draconian or inconsistent, support grew markedly for making the WHO more
institutionally robust and for addressing worries that the WHO is anomalously
weak given the now much more widely recognized magnitude of the dangers it is
charged with addressing. The WHO's assumption of unprecedented power in
the midst of the SARS break has gone largely unchallenged. Mid-crisis, the
World Health Assembly expanded WHO autonomy, granting powers to act
without specific approval from national governments. A long-term project to
revise and strengthen WHO rules gained momentum, with reforms pledging new
or clearer powers to report promptly on disease outbreaks based on unofficial
information-the method deployed in some desperation and with substantial, if
belated, efficacy to mobilize international pressure on the PRC to cooperate
with the WHO on SARS. In addition, reforms promise that, going forward, the
WHO will have clearer formal authority to issue global health alerts (as it did in
the case of SARS) and to send teams to inspect the adequacy of member states'
measures to contain international health threats (although these teams still
would need host-country cooperation, which China pointedly had withheld in the
early days of SARS).44
Second, much of China's relatively open and cooperative response may
simply-without significant intermedia.tion or amplification by a relatively weak
WHO regime-reflect the transformed self-interest of an internationally
integrated reform-era China. The PRC's increased economic dependence on the
outside world (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), and the transparency that has
accompanied it, have made China more vulnerable to foreign scrutiny and
pressure to cooperate with other states and the international community. It was
far less plausible than in an earlier era to imagine that SARS or information
about SARS could be kept within China, as the whistle-blowing e-mails to Hong
Kong by Beijing-based People's Liberation Army ("PLA") doctor Jiang
Yanyong and the intense international press coverage of SARS in China
illustrated. It was equally unlikely that China would be able to ignore pressure
to address the problem in ways that the international community demanded, as
the grudging but real cooperation with the WHO suggests. In an era of extensive
foreign trade and investment dependence, the economic and diplomatic costs to
China of non-cooperation were too high to bear. International investment
houses' downgrading of China's growth prospects, foreign companies' bans on
China travel, and other governments' sharp rebukes taught the PRC leadership
43. See Charles Piller. In SARS Aftermach, WHO's in Charge, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at 1
(discussing the WHO's "previously unthinkable autonomy" during the SARS epidemic and the weight
of its travel warnings on various countries).
44. Lawrence K. Altman, WHO Expecced Co Gain Broader Powers, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at
AlO; Global Solidarity Needed to Fight Diseases, WHO Chief Tells Annual Meeting (May 19, 2003),
at http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=7128&CR=worid&Crl=health&Kwl=Global+
Solidarity+Needed+to+Fight+Diseases&Kw2=&Kw3. See also Piller, supra note 43, at 1 (discussing
the likely continuance of the aggressive stance taken by the WHO during the SARS epidemic).
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that dismissing outsiders' concerns was no longer wise or feasible. 45
As these latter factors suggest, the PRC leadership's calculation of the
national economic interest-the advancement of which has been the cornerstone
of their legitimacy for nearly a quarter century-strongly dictated a significant
degree of international cooperation, even absent any persuasive or pressuring
effect of specific foreign demands. As early as July 2003, China's top SARS
official's comments were strikingly transparent about such motives for
cooperation, asserting that "the Chinese government [had shown it] is capable of
ensuring the health and security of foreign investors, and China is still one of the
most attractive regions of the world for foreign investors."46
Finally, China's relatively (if belatedly) open and cooperative response in
the SARS cycle of 2002-2003 may not project simply to similarly accommodating
responses in other future contexts. While the criticism and costs China endured
for its failure to embrace cooperation and transparency more quickly do offer
relatively strong assurances that there will be no repeat of the pattern of the last
months of 2002 and first months of 2003, this does not mean that the openness
and cooperation displayed in later months of the first SARS outbreak will
characterize China's engagement with the outside world on other issues
generally, or even other public health issues (perhaps even including a return of
SARS) if the factual circumstances or foreign demands differ in relevant ways.
SARS in 2002-2003 provided an unusual occasion in which foreign pressure
on China was exceptionally likely to be effective. Other states' governments had
an indisputably legitimate stake in how China handled the crisis, for their own
economies and public health appeared to be at risk. Clearly as a matter of
causation and (especially in light of Beijing's early stonewalling and foot-
dragging) quite probably as a matter of culpa~ility,China was responsible for the
problem that the world was calling on the PRC to help fix. Also, the panic that
arose in Hong Kong and Taiwan and, to a lesser degree elsewhere, had political
dimensions as well as economic ones: the relevant constituencies (especially in
Hong Kong and Taiwan where confidence in Beijing was already at a low ebb for
a variety of reasons) had to be reassured that the PRC was sufficiently
competent and reliable.
Moreover, what outsiders demanded of China was less offensive to the
regime's notion of domestic sovereignty than were many other international calls
on China for action or reform. Sharing public health or epidemiological data,
allowing WHO teams access, and accepting foreign advice and assistance on
disease prevention, monitoring, and containment were a good deal less
problematic than such other foreigner-pressed reforms such as those that
addressed China's lack of democracy, weak legal system, human rights record, or
vestigial non-market elements of its economy.
Few issues are likely to equal the SARS outbreak of 2002-2003 in providing
45. See supra notes 21-24, 32-35 and accompanying text for discussion of SARS effect on China's
economy and international relations.
46. China to Create Better Environmenl for Foreign Investor Says Vice Premier, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, July 15,2003.
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so compelling an occasion for an urgent exertion of pressure from abroad that
appears legitimate and compatible with self-interest on both sides.
In the PRC today, the forms of bowing to foreign pressure and criticism and
giving an international institution free reign that characterized part of the
Chinese response to SARS still are not small matters. The compliant and
cooperative face of the PRC's handling of the international dimension of SARS
entailed acquiescing in outside "interference" in what Beijing traditionally would
call a domestic matter, and public international concessions that China's rulers
had not dealt successfully with the problem on their own and with their usual
methods. Such moves chafe against the regime's exceptionally strong, even
paranoid, commitment to state sovereignty and, in turn, opacity to the
international community. This view of sovereignty is a carefully cultivated
legacy of China's nineteenth and twentieth century humiliation by foreign
powers, and an important element in the reform-era regime's increased
dependence on nationalism as a basis of legitimacy. Aspects of it have been
amply on display in other international or external aspects of the SARS crisis
and China's response.
IV. CHINESE WALLS AND "SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION SYNDROME"
The transparent, cooperative dimension of China's engagement with the
outside world on the SARS issue came grudgingly and coexisted throughout with
a diametrically different approach. Initially unable to move Beijing to grant
WHO teams access to affected areas, the WHO had to go public with
information it had gleaned and await mounting international pressure, losing
precious weeks in the urgent mission to understand SARS's origin and spread.
WHO first learned of the illness when the son of a former WHO employee
e-mailed the WHO's communicable diseases section director about a fatal illness
in southern China that authorities were refusing to allow to be reported. 47 Hong
Kong's inquiry into the SARS crisis in early 2004 revealed that Guangdong
officials had refused to inform Hong Kong counterparts of the emergence of
SARS because they regarded such withholding as a "legal requirement" because
"infectious diseases were classified as state secrets. "48 As late as early April, the
still-to-be-sacked Health Minister Zhang Wenkang dismissed WHO travel
advisories with a glib statement that it was "perfectly safe to come to China,"49
and scolded foreign media for "irresponsible" reporting on SARS.50 WHO
teams were allowed to begin serious work only shortly before Zhang's
valedictory expressions of disdain, and only after they confronted Chinese
47. Piller, supra note 43, at 1.
48. Mary Ann Benitez, Health Chief Was Told Outbreak a State Secret, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Jan. 13,2004, at 4.
49. Forney, supra note 34, at 15.
50. See Susan V. Lawrence, For the Top, Sorry is the Hardest Word to Sayan SARS, FAR
EASTERN ECON. REV., Apr. 17,2003. at 31 (describing how despite Chinese government's promise for
more openness in reporting on SARS, many Chinese and foreign residents still suspect the
government has been absolutely forthright).
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officials with-and attracted international media coverage of-evidence that the
SARS situation in the PRC was far more serious than official accounts admitted,
and issued the organization's first-ever international travel advisory (covering
Guangdong and Hong Kong). Even then, the WHO team had to wait longer still
(until the beginning of April) for access to the disease's suspected site of origin
in Guangdong, and had to contend with the preposterously rosy picture that
official Chinese sources continued to paint for another few weeks.51
International observers discerned significant ongoing impediments to WHO
operations in the PRC, including continuingly recalcitrant or incompetent PRC
gathering or providing of information. 52 Amid what some saw as implausible
reported patterns of infection in China (including, for example, near-zero levels
in Shanghai and wildly fluctuating numbers from Beijing), worries arose that the
WHO was being ineffectively or fatally restricted by PRC authorities.53 This
reinforced doubts about the credibility of disease reports that included, for
example, infection patterns (such as only two reported cases in Shanghai) that
seemed implausible.54 While the PLA's Dr. Jiang Yangyong escaped serious
retribution, Chinese authorities made it clear to him and foreign reporters that
they would no longer be speaking to one another55-a clear signal to other
Chinese who might be inclined to expose the outside world to the ongoing
official dissembling in China.
As the SARS crisis came under control, measures to stem the consumption
of civets and other wild animals showed signs of eroding once the intense
international scrutiny that proponents credited for their adoption began to abate.
A hotly debated Guangdong provincial draft law omitted a ban on consumption
of wild animals (beyond mere exhortations not to eat them), and a proposed
provision prescribing a ban included .no penalties. Angry Chinese
conservationists complained that local officials were succumbing to the demands
51. See Allen T. Cheng et aL, WHO Seeks Full Probe on Virus, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr.
10,2003, at 1; Altman & Bradsher, supra note 33, at A7 (discussing Hong Kong officials' criticism that
the WHO was "too quick to sound an international alarm"); David Lague et al., The China Virus, FAR
EASTERN EeON. REV., Apr. 10,2003, at 12-15 (discussing how the Chinese government's rigid control
of information about SARS hindered efforts to control the disease).
52. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, Chinese Official Says Disease is Controlled in City of Origin, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8,2003, at A8 (reporting that, on one occasion, WHO team waited more than a week for
PRC's permission to access Guangdong); Lawrence K. Altman, Virus Called Mostly Under Control,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2003, at A6 (noting WHO's concerns that PRC was not releasing SARS
information about regions of China outside Guangdong).
53. See Altman & Bradsher, supra note 33, at A7 (noting suspicions that PRC was under-
reporting SARS cases); Melody Chen, Mystery Illness Highlights Taiwan's Health Isolation, TAIPEI
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at 1 (suggesting Taiwan's isolation has decreased the WHO's effectiveness in
combating SARS).
54. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, The SARS Epidemic: Beijing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at A13
(citing PRC's repeated suspicious under-reporting of SARS cases).
55. Mure Dickie & Frances Williams, Chinese Doctor Who Blew Whistle on Cover-Up WillS
Media Praise-and Gag, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 2003, at 7; Beijing DOCTOr Pressured Not to Discuss
SARS with Foreign Media, Voice of America, (Apr. 10, 2003), at http://www.voa.gov/printerfr.cfm?
tablename=tblHomePage&articleID=308 (describing the discrepancies between the number of SARS
cases in Beijing reported by PRC authorities and by Dr. Jiang).
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of hunters and traders whose livelihoods were threatened by the ban. In
Guangdong and elsewhere in southern China, lax enforcement of legal
prohibitions was commonly reported, the enforcement difficulties posed by
distinguishing between banned "wild" and increasingly tolerated "farm-raised"
animals drew increasing attention, and reports of the reopening of exotic animal
markets,S6 the return of wild animals to menus,S7 and amendments to relax
regulatory restrictions became commonplace.58
With the SARS outbreak only a few months in the past, concerns began to
surface that PRC cooperation with outside authorities and conformity to
international standards and protocols were fading. In addition to the reports
concerning the fast-eroding restrictions on animal consumption, foreign
observers openly worried about whether the "short-term, heavy-handed"
response that included massive, tight health screenings at airports, hastily drawn
plans for an emergency response in major cities to any sign of a new outbreak,
and scrutiny of data from, and monitoring of, the myriad local health provider
entities around China could be sustained. Reports of a handful of late 2003 and
early 2004 cases from Guangdong, and an initial denial by local authorities,
triggered anew worries of under-reporting and attempts to conceal problems
from the international community, as did what some saw as suspiciously absent
reports of human cases of bird flu from the mainland when it had begun erupting
elsewhere in the region by early 2004. Confidence in China's post-SARS
commitment to international transparency on the issue hardly benefited from
comments by a vice governor of the Guangdong province that appeared to
threaten legal consequences against Hong Kong media that might report on new
2003-2004 cases of SARS on the mainland without first receiving official
confirmation.59
As this last point underscores, some of the most severe and complex effects
of China's recalcitrance toward international pressure emerged in geographic
areas where the PRC views questions of sovereignty as particularly sensitive and
brooking no compromise-the recently recovered or still unrecovered territories
of peripheral China that the PRC has sought to reintegrate under a "one
56. Yi Hu, Trade Ban is Lifted but Wildlife Still off Mainland Menus, S. CHINA MOR ING POST,
July 12,2003, at 5.
57. Chow Chung-yan, Wild Animals to Return to Shenzhen Menus, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Aug. 25, 2003, at 4.
58. See Chinese Agency Examines Debate on Proposed Law to Ban Eating Wild Animals,
XINHUA NEWS AGE CY, July 9, 2003 (detailing the competing concerns of animal breeders and
environmental groups in the debate on the proposal to ban the consumption of wild animals);
Guangdong Passes Regulations on Wildlife Consumption, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 25, 2003
(describing how legislation that compels people to give up wildlife cuisine passed in Guadong's
provincial legislature after two months of discussion and revision).
59. See Peter Harmsen, China Probably Has Human Bird Flit Cases, AGE. 'CE FRANCE PRESSE,
Feb. 4,2004 (asserting that given the number of people, chickens, and outbreaks of bird flue in China
the proportional number of outbreaks is low); H.K. Slams Guangdong Provo For Lale Reporl of SARS
Case, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 9, 2004 (describing a Hong Kong official's dissatisfaction with
Chinese authorities's release of information on new SARS cases and his corresponding demand to be
notified about any suspected SARS cases).
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country, two systems" model and its juridical instantiation, the Special
Administrative Region. Indeed, the crisis that attended and followed the
illness's arrival in Hong Kong and Taiwan has legal-political dimensions that
might be called "Special Administrative Region Syndrome."
The symptoms here have differed somewhat between the two cases. To
some in Hong Kong, SARS was the latest and potentially the most serious
episode of inept or weak governance by a SAR leadership that Beijing had
foisted on the territory and that failed to assert Hong Kong's interests with its
PRC masters. The Tung Chee-hwa administration faced criticism for a belated
and insufficiently effective response to the SARS outbreak. Critics from across
the SAR's political spectrum denounced the government for being shamefully
slow or timid. The indictments grew especially sharp when an outbreak swept
through one large apartment building and into another in the Amoy Gardens, a
block of middle-class housing in densely populated Kowloon. That development
came embarrassingly hard upon the heels of government statements that the
SARS situation was improving. Although authorities then moved to isolate the
complex and relocate its residents, some had already left and the incident
intensified calls on the regime to make more aggressive use of powers granted
under Hong Kong's long standing quarantine law and the SAR's police powers
more broadly. Staff at an affected hospital complained bitterly to the Hospital
Authority Chief that the Department of Health had not done enough to track
people who might have had contact with SARS victims. Ridicule greeted Chief
Executive Tung's appearance at a cabinet meeting in a surgical mask, and his
wife's donning mask, gloves, gown, and goggles when she distributed "hygiene
kits" on the streets of heavily SARS-hit neighborhoods.6o
As already low public confidence in Tung's administration sank, calls for his
resignation or ouster rose, and an opposition members' motion calling on Tung
to step down came to a vote (although falling short of a majority) in the
legislature. To some of the many critics of the SAR government, mishandling of
SARS was the latest in a series of botched efforts at crisis management that
included the bird flu of 1997 and the Asian financial crisis-related economic
downturn.
After the 2002-2003 crisis ended, a series of official inquiries followed,
including one by a special joint PRC-Hong Kong commission of experts, and
another by the SAR's legislature. Those investigations and other reporting laid
much of the blame at the feet of the SAR administration, citing significant
shortcomings in the health system, a pattern of higher-level health officials
ignoring warnings, and evidence from front line medical personnel. While PRC
authorities too faced criticism for not being more forthcoming, the assessments
hinted (though they did little more than that, perhaps because of litigation
concerns) that Hong Kong authorities might have pushed harder or been more
suspicious.6]
60. Bryan Walsh, System Failure, TIME INTERNATIO AL, May 5, 2003. at 18.
61. See Mary Kwang, Panel on SARS in HK Steers Clear of Blame Game, STRAITS TiMES
(Singapore), Oct. 3, 2003 (describing international panel of medical experts' conclusion that no one
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Worse still, SARS in the SAR seemed to show the potentially deadly
consequences of what some see as the Hong Kong leadership's subservient
posture toward Beijing.62 To its harshest critics, the Tung government showed
its true, and familiar, colors in failing to extract or perhaps even elicit prompt
disclosure and cooperation from PRC authorities concerning a problem that
originated in nearby parts of China and that would predictably spread to Hong
Kong. 63 Once the SARS crisis accelerated in Hong Kong, SAR officials making
sanguine comments began to sound to skeptical ears as if they were reading from
the same script as PRC former trade minister Long Yongtu, who notoriously
opined in late March that three hundred cases were not particularly noteworthy
in a place with six million people.64
On this view, it was too little too late when the Hong Kong government
declared in mid-April that Hu Jintao's talks with Tung during the Chinese
president's tour to Shenzhen had included Hu's pledge to provide the SAR with
"'the full support of the central government.",65 For its opponents and critics,
the Tung government's behavior was all too predictable and typical from an
administration that had failed to defend Hong Kong's judicial autonomy when
the Court of Final Appeal issued a controversial decision not to Beijing's liking,
and that was poised to compromise Hong Kongers' liberties by preparing unduly
restrictive legislation to implement the anti-sedition article in the Basic Law for
the Hong Kong SAR.66 The distrust <?f the Tung administration was such that
the most visible post-crisis SARS investigation committee came under suspicion
over concerns that it was insufficiently independent of an excessively PRC-
subservien t administra tion.67
person or government mishandled the SARS outbreak but blaming inadequate information from
Guandong where SARS first appeared).
62. See Wu Guoguang, HK HSiN PAD: Article on China's Response co SARS, WORLD NEWS
CONNECTIO , June 3, 2003 (arguing that the Tiananmen Incident of June 4, 1989, in which the
student-led pro-democracy movement was crushed brutally by units of the Chinese Army, and SARS
reflected similar or related flaws in the PRC political and legal system), available {/( LEXIS, Newsfile
Library, Global News Wire File.
63. As one commentator put it, "[C]ynics say, Hong Kong was doomed when Tung Chee-hwa
was anointed as the chief executive." Chris Yeung, Infeaed with a Crisis of Confidence in HK, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 5, 2003, at 4. See also HK. Slams, supra note 59, (quoting Hong Kong
Democratic Party legislator's urging Hong Kong government to be tough with Guangdong to prevent
recurrence of 2002-2003 pattern of failure to challenge cover-up or mistakes on the mainland in
handling infectious disease outbreaks).
64. From Bottom to Top, Procuring information on the SARS Epidemic, KAIFANG ZAZHI, June
2003.
65. Keith Bradsher, A Respiracory Illness; Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,2003, at A12.
66. See Martin eM. Lee, China's Censors Extend Their Reach, N.Y. TnvIEs, June 3, 2003, at A31
(discussing Hong Kong national security bill "that would criminalize 'treason, sedition, subversion, and
theft of state secrets'''); Tyler Marshall, Beijing Has a Problem: Its Man in liang Kong, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 3,2004, at AS (discussing the increasing unpopularity of Hong Kong's chief executive Tung in the
early days of the SARS crisis).
67. See len Cheng, Rats Theory Adds Fuel to Debate Over Cause of SARS Outbreak, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2004, at 5 (identifying that the committee sought to rebuff claims that it lacked
independence): Accountability Goes Begging al the Top, S. CHINA MORNl G POST, Mar. 13,2004, at 3
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In Taiwan, conflict over the PRC's long-standing agenda to integrate
Taiwan as some variation of a Special Administrative Region drove the
international law and politics of SARS. As the disease invaded the island,
Beijing stuck to its long-standing policy of opposing Taiwan's quest for
participation in the WHO, even under the unusual and limited status of an
"observer" (rather than member) and a "health entity" (rather than a state).68
This was part of the PRC's intractable opposition to Taiwan's participation in
any states-member-only organizations-a category that includes the United
Nations ("U.N.") and U.N.-affiliate organs such as the WHO.69 For Beijing,
Taiwan's participation in such bodies is unacceptable because it threatens to
enhance international recognition of Taiwan's state-like status and, thus,
Taiwan's ability to resist the PRC's calls to reunify on SAR or SAR-like terms.
The PRC was willing to sacrifice on this front much of the international gain it
sought through cooperation (even if belated and grudging) with the WHO over
the outbreaks on the mainland. Blocked by PRC opposition from working fully
with Taiwan, the WHO was left to deal with Taipei indirectly through the United
States' Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") until Beijing finally acquiesced in
the WHO's sending a mission to the island. As the SARS count climbed
alarmingly in Taiwan, WHO spokesmen lamely offered that such efforts showed
that the organization put health above politics.
As the SARS toll spiraled upward in Taiwan, the PRC's intransigent
position began to play especially badly. Calls for WHO participation and access
for Taiwan became more compelling as a global public health problem loomed
and the WHO took a lead role in the international response. The PRC sought to
blunt criticism, finally consenting-for "humanitarian reasons"-to the WHO's
sending a team to Taiwan in May 2003, and asserting that Taiwan could reap the
benefits that the WHO had to offer without a change in Taiwan's status at the
organization.7° The PRC pointed to cooperation and opportunities for exchange
across the strait on SARS and related health issues, and the PRC's permission to
Taiwan medical experts to participate in a WHO conference on SARS.71
(noting that Tung removed the Chairman of the inquiry panel).
68. Speech by Chinese Delegation Leader, State Council Vice Premier and Acting Health
Minister Wu Yi, Address at the 56th Session of the World Health Association Deliberations on the
Resolution Regarding Taiwan (May 19, 2003), at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjblzzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/
2594/2602/t22807.h tm.
69. See, e.g., Chinese Envoy to u.N. Condemns Taiwan's Latest Membership Bid, XINHUA EWS
AGE CY, Aug. 8, 2003 (summarizing the PRC's longstanding opposition to Taiwanese membership in
the UN or any UN organization).
70. See Another Failure for Taiwanese Separatists, CHINA DAILY, May 21, 2003 (arguing that
Taiwan does not need membership in the WHO in order to combat SARS since Taiwan already has
unblocked access to the technical and material resources of the mainland and the WHO), available at
LEXIS, Newsfile Library, Global News Wire File; RMRB 'Commentary': Taiwan Using SARS Issue to
Join WHO as Observer, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, May 17, 2003 (criticizing Taiwan's efforts to gain
'observer' status at the WHO in order to combat SARS), available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, Global
News Wire File.
71. See RMRB 'Commentary,' supra note 70 (criticizing Taiwan's efforts to gain 'observer' status
at the WHO in order to combat SARS); Chinese Envoy to UN, supra note 69 (discussing Chinese
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Beijing's move to include a Taiwanese representative and opposition party
legislator in its delegation to a WHO-sponsored SARS conference sought to
illustrate the point (although it unsurprisingly angered Taiwanese ruling party
representatives).72
Nonetheless, such gestures of inclusion and accommodation were limited
and, at best, part of a mixed message. In the SARS crisis and its wake,
Taiwanese officials and commentators could argue forcefully that Taiwan's
exclusion from fuller engagement with the WHO cost lives in Taiwan, and that
indirect cooperation through bilateral relations with the United States' CDC, or
ad hoc interaction with the WHO on occasions when China deigned to approve,
were inadequate substitutes.73 In turn, any resulting impediment to the SARS
fight in 2002-2003 and in any future recurrence or similar international public
health threat from Taiwan could be portrayed credibly as a risk to the world,
with residents and visitors traveling to and from the island despite (or before)
WHO travel advisories and Taiwan's tightening (but significantly evaded) travel
restrictions and quarantine requirements.74
Beijing's position looked highly irresponsible and insensitive, in part
because the disease that was exacting a mounting human cost in Taiwan, and
beyond, had originated in the PRe. PRC sources seemed to confirm critics'
harshest charges and observers' darkest suspicions when they defended China's
intransigence by denouncing Taiwanese. authorities (without a trace of irony) for
"politicizing" SARS and for using SARS as a pretext for pushing for Taiwan
independence and dividing China's sovereignty-an evil certainly more grave
than SARS, in the eyes of official China.75 It was similarly unhelpful to the
PRC's agenda when its WHO representative was quoted as saying that "nobody
opposition to Taiwanese membership in UN).
72. See Sandy Huang, Beijing's Moves 'Fanning Independence Sentiment', WORLD NEWS
CONNECTION, June 22, 2003 (arguing that the PRe's inclusion of a Taiwanese representative at a
WHO-sponsored SARS conference was an attempt to belittle Taiwan), available at LEXlS, Newsfile
Library, Global News Wire File; Sun Shengliang, Taiwan Affairs Scholar Says Chen Shuibian Tries to
Avert Situation with Plebiscite, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Aug. 17, 2003 (describing how Chen
Shuiban has used the SARS epidemic to incite populist sentiments in Taiwan and intensify cross-strait
confrontation in order to improve his election prospects), available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library,
Global News Wire File.
73. See Government Information Office, Republic of China (Taiwan), The Global Health
Imperatives for Granting Taiwan WHO Membership (arguing that Taiwan's exclusion from WHO is
contrary to stated goals of WHO because it excludes Taiwan's 23 million citizens and limits Taiwan's
ability to share its considerable health resources), available at http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-
gp/join_who/who1.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004); Chen, supra note 53 (providing additional insight);
"One China" Roof Has a Leak at WHA, LIBERTY TIMES, June 8, 2003, at 8 (describing China's
blockade of Taiwan's admission into WHO).
74. This line of argument continued after the travel ban for Taiwan was lifted, with the
Taiwanese Premier declaring, "Yielding to China's political pressure and excluding Taiwan from the
global disease control network will create an irreparable loophole in the network [which] is unfair to
Taiwan and a loss to the whole world." Premier Yu Shyi-kun Holds News Conference After Taiwan
Declared SA RS-Free, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, July 5, 2003.
75. See Another Failure, supra note 70 (discussing Taiwan's efforts for acknowledgement by
WHO); Chinese Envoy, supra note 69 (describing China's opposition to Taiwan admission to WHO).
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cared about the island."76 Such positions surely helped secure support for the
resolution, passed over Beijing's objection, directing the WHO's director general
to "respond appropriately to all requests for WHO assistance for SARS
surveillance, prevention, and control."77
Beijing's basic stance remained unchanged to the end of the 2002-2003
SARS episode and beyond. Taiwanese commentators complained about China's
representatives arguing that a concededly disease-free Taiwan should not be
taken off the WHO travel ban list until a still-not-cleared PRC was.78 In the
months since the end of the crisis, the PRC has continued to resist, successfully
but over notably sharpened opposition, Taiwan's quest for greater participation
in the WHO.
As much of this suggests, SARS-related developments for Taiwan, like
those for Hong Kong, revealed and exacerbated distrust of the PRC and
deepened distaste for Beijing's model for recovery or reunification of the
affected area. Here, the symptoms of "Special Administrative Region
Syndrome" are multiple and complex. Most simply, what many in Taiwan
viewed as China's callous and bullying approach to SARS, Taiwan, and the
WHO question-and the China-sourced disease itself-are generally credited
with strengthening "anti-China" or "pro-independence" sentiment on the island.
Relatively neutral observers described the advent of SARS as reducing the
pressure on Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian (whose Democratic
Progressive Party ("DPP") is toward the pro-independence end of Taiwan's
political spectrum) to forge closer cross-strait relations. The harm wrought, and
the threat posed, by SARS instilled among ordinary Taiwanese new sources of
wariness of closer ties to the PRc.79 The Chen administration and pro-DPP
media were able to use Beijing's behavior .toward Taiwan in the SARS crisis as a
basis for advancing agendas of distance and, indeed, independence from the
mainland.8o More concretely, WHO representation was among the possible
subjects for referenda that Chen proposed (but ultimately was not able to get on
76. Tyler Marshall & Mark Magnier, Taiwan's Chen Defends Move on Referendum, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2004, at AI.
77. Monique Chu, WHO Builds SARS Bridge with Taiwan, TAIPEI TIMES, May 30, 2003, at 1;
McNeil, supra note 33, at A8.
78. A Separate Rooffor a Separate State, TAPEI TIMES, July 2, 2003, at 8.
79. Marshall & Magnier, supra note 76, at AI; Tyler Marshall, Taiwan Keeps Its Distance from
China, L.A. TIMES. Sep. 8, 2003, at A3; Philip P. Pan, New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan,
WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2004, at A13; McNeil, supra note 33, at A8.
80. See, e.g., A Separate Roof for a Separate State, supra note 78, at 8 (arguing that the PRC's
attempts to block Taiwan's participation in international conferences is destroying the PRC's
credibility and increasing Taiwan's support in the international community); "One China" Roof Has a
Leak at WHA, supra note 73, at 8 (describing China's efforts to block Taiwan's admission into WHO);
cf. Flor Wang, Good Quarantine Preparations Needed to Reopen "Mini Links,' Central NEWS AGENCY
(Taiwan), July 4,2003 (discussing Director of Legal Affairs for Taiwan government's Mainland Affairs
Council-the principal government body for cross-Strait relations----declaring that a cautious approach
was needed to reopening the "mini-links" between the mainland and the Taiwan-controlled islands
just off the PRC coast; the mini-links are generally regarded as a possible precursor to the "three
links" which would entail direct transportation links between Taiwan and the mainland).
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the ballot under the narrow referendum law passed by the legislature in late
2003). And, despite Chen's public claims to the contrary, holding any
referendum in Taiwan-and especially a referendum on Taiwan's representation
in a U.N.-affiliated organization--inevitably resonated with questions of
Taiwan's state or state-like status and thus its possible independence and its clear
rejection of any SAR-like formula for a condominium with the PRC.81
Beijing's spokesmen were reduced to railing against Chen for pushing the
WHO referendum and other measures that were politicizing the SARS issue-a
charge that was only likely to alienate Taiwanese public opinion further, given
Beijing's own highly political approach to Taiwan, SARS, and the WHO.82 The
DPP's and Chen's political opponents in Taiwan, the Kuomintang ("KMT") /
People First Party ("PFP") alliance that is generally seen as toward the more
pro-reunification end of Taiwan's political spectrum, were left ducking the issue
or playing defense. Notably, the opposition bloc's healthy lead in public opinion
polls concerning the March 2004 presidential election began to erode at the same
time that SARS began to hit Taiwan.
That SARS and SARS-related issues seem to have had partisan benefits for
President Chen and the DPP suggests the severity of the Special Administrative
Region Syndrome that the SARS crisis revealed and exacerbated. The adverse
economic impact of SARS in 2002-2003 (and the scares over the return of SARS
with the confirmation of a new cas~ in 2003-2004) might well have hurt the
incumbent president and the relatively pro-independence bloc that backed him.
After all, Taiwan's economic malaise during the first Chen term (2000-2004) was
generally thought to be a good campaign issue for his opponents, who favored
closer economic ties with the PRC and a lessening of the security threat posed by
tense cross-strait relations as part of a package of economic solutions. In the
end, however, it seems that any such effect was overwhelmed by SARS-
exacerbated fears of closer economic and related social ties with the mainland,
Beijing's politically alienating approach to the WHO and related issues, the lack
of competence and transparency shown in the central Chinese government's
handling of SARS, and Chen's ability more generally to shift the focus of the
election from economics to identity politics that stressed the unacceptability to
"the Taiwanese" of integration with the mainland under any legal or
constitutional framework that would make Taiwan a SAR-like entity within a
greater China.
In addition, the SARS outbreak in Taiwan might have prompted or
deepened a crisis of confidence in the government, as it did in Hong Kong.
There were some signs of this problem in Taiwan, including reported widespread
noncompliance with quarantine orders, numerous rumors about unreported
outbreaks, and pubic alarm about the perceived bungling and resulting spreading
81. See, e.g., Hearing on Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Balance Before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, 108th Congo 56-71 (2004) (statement of Jacques DeLisle,
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania).
82. See Shengliang. supra note 72 (discussing socio-political implications of SARS).
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of the disease at one major hospital. 83 But, in the end, the governing authorities
in Taiwan did not face the wrath and disdain of their Hong Kong counterparts.
The reasons likely included some rationales that may reflect differences in the
way that Special Administrative Region Syndrome afflicts present and potential
SARs, including: greater competence or perceived competence of the
government in handling SARS, and the political legitimacy of a locally elected
government (rather than one imposed by and perceived as answerable to
Beijing).84
Special Administrative Region Syndrome's two principal cases may prove
to be linked in the SARS context in another, related way as well. Some of the
initial infections of Taiwanese likely occurred as travelers passed through Hong
Kong between the mainland and Taiwan along the circuitous route mandated by
a policy rooted in the Taiwanese government's worries that more direct and
efficient links would deepen economic integration with the PRC and strengthen
Beijing's ability to press for reunification on its SAR-like terms. The
implications of SARS here are somewhat complicated but hardly make an SAR-
like arrangement more appealing on Taiwan. This probable pathway of
infection suggests the PRC's Taiwan agenda might be seen as contributing to
Taiwan's SARS problem (albeit indirectly through the policies against direct
cross-strait travel that Taiwan's leaders defend as merely defensive, or through a
SARS peril in Hong Kong that many Taiwanese, and many Hong Kong
residents, saw as worsened by the problems with the territory's SAR status and
related problems). Some of the people who spread SARS to Taiwan, even if
they passed through Hong Kong, likely were infected in the PRe. "Direct links"
and SAR-like status and integration with the PRC for Taiwan plausibly would
seem only to make the risk of SARS worse, as many Taiwanese commentators
and political leaders claimed or hinted. .
The merits of some of the charges directed at the PRC from Taiwan and
Hong Kong can be debated. There is room for disagreement about how inept or
weak the Tung administration has been, or how much of a difference fuller
access to the WHO would have made for Taiwan, or whether Taiwan and Hong
Kong received significantly less cooperation from Beijing than did other at-risk
countries during the crucial period. But that is not the principal point here.
Whatever one's position on those issues, the SARS crisis of 2002-2003 and the
threat of the return of SARS or the advent of some similar public health threat
(including, for example, avian influenza) have added credibility to claims that the
SAR legal and constitutional structure for Hong Kong and the PRC's attempt to
push a SAR structure for Taiwan are dangerous to the people of those territories
and the wider world. At the least, they suggest in particularly vivid fashion the
83. Jason W. Sapsin et al., SARS and International Legal Preparedness, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 155,
164 (2004).
84. Other more specifically Taiwanese political factors may have been relevant as well, induding
the complicated partisan political environment in Taiwan. For example, the mayor of the most
afflicted city (Taipei's Ma Ying-jeou) is widely regarded as one of the opposition camp's best hopes for
taking back the presidency from the party that held it at the time of the SARS outbreak and will hold
it through 2008.
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need to recognize the possibility of serious limits to the openness, transparency,
and engagement with the international legal and institutional order for public
health that characterized some aspects of the PRC's response to SARS.
Indeed, one of the central and most salient aspects of Special
Administrative Region Syndrome is that Beijing remains strongly committed to
the legal and political principle that issues involving Taiwan and Hong Kong are
internal matters, not international ones. Thus, while the formal SAR framework
and the practical politics of an international order in which the world regards
Hong Kong and, especially, Taiwan as having a significant degree of
international legal personality and functional autonomy, the official Chinese
view remains that Beijing's consent ultimately lies behind Hong Kong's and
Taiwan's freedom (if any) to deal separately with SARS and to deal separately
(and transparently and cooperatively) with the international community in
addressing SARS. And the domestic face (in the core PRC areas) of China's
handling of SARS has been no less complex and contradictory than Beijing's
engagement with the outside world in addressing SARS.
V. SCHIZOPHRENIC AUTHORITARIAN REGIME SYNDROME (I): GLOCALIZATION,
TRANSPARENCY AND Accou TABILITY
The pattern and relatively rapid pace of SARS's spread reflects the relative
"openness" of China a quarter-century into the post-Mao reform era. The
SARS story in Hong Kong and Taiwan are among the most dramatic examples
of this side of contemporary China's Janus-faced reality that SARS has brought
starkly to light: China has become "glocalized." SARS spread from Guangdong
to Beijing, a few other major PRC cities, Hong Kong, Taipei, Hanoi, Singapore,
Toronto, and other urban centers in more than two dozen countries.85 SARS did
so at a time when few cases appeared to have arisen in rural China outside the
disease's original epicenter.86 This epidemiological pattern illustrates that
"globalization" for the PRC has meant that China's coastal cities and their
immediate environs are in some respects more closely linked to urban localities
in East Asia and in the advanced industrial economies (and within China) than
they are to the Chinese hinterland. On one account, SARS reached Beijing from
southeastern China by means of a passenger on a flight from Hong Kong. The
outbreak of the disease in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia appear
traceable to business travelers coming or returning from China.87
This pattern reflects travel behavior and transportation links that are the
products of the laws, policies, and practices of reform-era China that have
85. WHO, Cumulative Numbers, supra note 7.
86. For distribution of cases within China, see WHO data, at http://www.who.intlcsr/sars/
china2003_06_04.pdf (last visited July 10, 2004).
87. See Indira A.R. Lakshmanan. Air China Flight 112: Tracking the Genesis of a Plague,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 18,2003, at Al (recounting the stories of sundry Air China passengers, some of
whom were diagnosed with SARS following their nights); Keith Bradsher, Carrier of New Virus Made
7 Flights Before Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,2003. at AlO (reporting that SARS carrier traveled
through several European countries before seeking treatment).
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adopted market principles and opened the economy to foreign investment and
trade. Reflecting economic and legal incentives and legal permissions granted by
the PRC, foreign capital has predictably flowed to China's developed coastal
cities and adjacent regions, and much of that capital has focused on export
industries which required easy access to international transportation links.
Special favorable laws and infrastructure investment by the PRC state reinforced
the pattern by focusing on coastal cities generally and, especially in the crucial
early years, on the areas nearest to Hong Kong and Taiwan. These, of course,
created the pathways for SARS.
Yet, as the past pattern and feared trajectory of SARS in China underscore,
the rapidly developing areas of China's increasingly urbanized east and southeast
are by no means insulated-in politics, economics, or public health-from the
problems of the PRC's troubled rural and inland areas. SARS appears to have
traveled to PRC cities and the wider world from origins in areas of the Chinese
countryside where the factories that have built the PRC's economic boom stand
amid densely populated agrarian areas with bad sanitation, near-tropical
climates, myriad farm animals, and hunting and ranching sectors that supply
poorly-regulated urban markets-essentially take-out zoos-with live
ingredients for dishes made from exotic beasts. 88 As earlier epidemic diseases
that threatened to become epidemics have made dreadfully clear, this slice of
rural China provides a fertile environment for the mutation and transmission of
diseases from animals to humans, and the generation of serious dangers to
international public health. This occurred even before the advent of today's
dense connections that outward-oriented and market-based economic
development has forged between such areas and urban centers in China and
beyond. The point was not lost on PRC officials. Beijing officials moved, albeit
belatedly in May, 2003, to monitor more carefully and quarantine new arrivals
and returnees from the countryside, and joined Guangdong, Shanghai, and other
provincial and municipal governments in issuing bans or restrictions on the
consumption or sale of animals brought in from the countryside and suspected of
being transmitters of SARS.89
These dense links between urban and rural China and the poor hygiene and
88. See Ezekiel Emmanuel, Preventing the Nexc SARS, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2003, at A25 (noting
that new viruses and new strains of old ones thrive where animals and people live in close proximity);
John Pomfret, In Chinese Village, Few Clues to Illness, WASH. POST, Apr. 9,2003, at A17 (reporting
that SARS "could have infected humans by 'jumping' from another animal species'); SARS Epidemic
Increases Personal Hygiene Awareness, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Apr. 28, 2003 (asserting that good personal
hygiene, such as frequent hand-washing, is the most effective way to prevent SARS), available ac
http://english.people.com.cnl200304/28/eng20030428_115959.shtml; Keith Bradsher & Lawrence K.
Altman, Strain of SARS Fou.nd in 3 Animal Species in Asia. N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2003, at Al
(discussing containment concerns given the recent discovery of the SARS virus in three animal
species): Elizabeth Rosenthal, From China's Provinces, a Crafty Germ Breaks Out, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2003, at 1 (stating that SARS easily could have moved from "animals to humans in the kitchens
and food stalls of Guangdong").
89. Beijing Has "No Necessicy" to Undercover Beijing SARS Cases, BUSINESS DAILY UPDATE,
May 20, 2003, available at 2003 WL 18925753. See also supra note 56 and accompanying text
(discussing ban of wild animal consumption).
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crowded conditions of China's cities also raised the prospect of a reverse spread
of SARS to lesser cities and villages-a vision sure to haunt authorities in the
PRC, WHO, and elsewhere. Several pathways are all too available. More than
one hundred million PRC citizens, almost all of them recent migrants from the
countryside, live without official permission in and near major Chinese cities,
with the SARS-hit metropolises of Beijing and Guangzhou among the top
destinations. Sometimes by choice and sometimes upon forcible "repatriation"
by city authorities, a small fraction of this "floating population" returns to its
home areas every day. Because economic opportunity and high status
employment are highly concentrated in the PRC's metropolises, many lawful
residents of China's largest cities come from the country's smaller cities and
townships. Whatever their legal residence status, a large number of urbanites
maintain ties and often travel to their old abodes throughout the country, often
on cramped and unclean trains.
Unfortunate timing exacerbated these threats during the SARS crisis of
2002-2003 and would do so again with future outbreaks of SARS or any other
similarly seasonal infectious diseases. In 2003, SARS was spiking in Guangdong
around the lunar new year in February, a peak season for travel within China.
Before the disease had been brought under control in Beijing and elsewhere, the
May Day holiday-which in recent years had been extended to a full week to
stimulate the economy by encouraging consumers' leisure spending-loomed as
. another occasion for much higher than normal domestic travel, until the
. government officially curtailed the customary vacation for 2003.
As word of SARS spread in Beijing, so too did fears among officials that the
risks posed by the baseline rate of human traffic would surge as hundreds of
thousands of city residents, including potential transmitters of the disease,
dispersed to cities, towns, and villages throughout China, whether to escape the
perceived perils of the capital or simply because the closure of schools and
businesses left them with little reason to stay. Rumors that martial law would be
imposed or that the city would be quarantined accelerated the rate of flight
before Beijing authorities imposed more effective checks at the transportation
nodes in and around the capital at the beginning of May. In addition, the
possible flight of medical personnel (coupled with predictable reluctance to
serve-and risk illness and quarantine-among some health staffers who
remained in place) raised the risk that Beijing and other affected or potentially
affected urban centers would face declining capacity to treat or contain local
cases, thereby strengthening still further the vectors for the illness's spread.
One prominently reported case illustrates some of these dangers: A SARS-
. infected Beijing-based doctor, Li Song, returned to his home town in Inner
Mongolia in March 2003, where he reportedly infected dozens of local residents,
including three close relatives who died. According to the authorities, the case
was still more disturbing. They jailed him, asserting that he was aware of his
illness and recklessly put others at risk when he left the local hospital, in which
he had become a patient. 90 Other less famous cases suggests how widespread
90. Joseph Kahn, Man's Virus Infects Towll, Killing His Family, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,2003, at AI:
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such potentially SARS-spreading behavior was. The pseudonymous Xu Li, like
many of her peers, faced no restrictions or monitoring when she left already
SARS-afflicted Guangzhou for her home city of Taiyuan in the northern
province of Shanxi in February 2003. There she infected her parents, who died,
and others and exhibited serious symptoms herself, but she nonetheless was
allowed to travel unquestioned to Beijing, thereby perhaps becoming the first
SARS case in Shanxi and in Beijing. 91 Similarly, Yue Shoubing, a Party cadre
from a village near Taiyuan, traveled to a Party meeting in Guangdong in mid-
March, then to Beijing for hospital treatment when he became ill, then back to
Taiyuan to another hospital, and later still back to his village, producing over one
hundred infections along the way.92
If such avenues were to disseminate SARS broadly in China's secondary
cities and hinterland, the public health consequences would be catastrophic.
Those areas badly lack even the relatively limited public health infrastructure-
and the public institutional infrastructure more generally-that Beijing,
Guangzhou, and other major municipalities can deploy in fighting such illnesses.
Hospitals, trained medical personnel, medicines, sewage, sanitation, and the
capacity to monitor potential cases and impose quarantine or isolation are all in
much scarcer supply in China's more remote and less developed areas. 93 Indeed,
medical services-especially the clinics that might identify the illness, instruct at-
risk residents and help to contain SARS-have deteriorated in poorer areas
during two decades of uneven economic development and falling state
allocations for healthcare and public health. The resources and capacities of
local governments to provide public goods and public order more generally have
followed a similar, sharply downward trajectory. Any reports of small outbreaks
of SARS in such places were understandably causes for great alarm and worries
about the regime's ability to respond. .
Since the SARS episode of 2003, the means for coping with or reducing
significantly the risks that were evident last time have been, at best, minimally
enhanced and, in some respects, eroded. Some measures, such as upgrading the
infrastructure of clinics, hospitals, and trained staff could not be accomplished in
short order. Plans to revise public health-related laws, including quarantine
provisions, and to enhance the bureaucratic clout of the Chinese Centers for
Disease Control have stalled amid political and policy disagreement. 94 Informed
Laurie Garrett, Spreader of Sickness, EWSDAY, June 15,2003, at A7.
91. Lai Hailong, Who Knocked Over the SARS Domino?, ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE (China
News Agency), June 3, 2003 (tracing the spread of SARS throughout China), available at LEXIS,
Newsfile Library, Asia/Pacific News File.
92. Garrett, supra note 90, at A7.
93. See Erik Eckholm, Cases of Lethal New Illnesses Rise Sharply in Interior Region, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15,2003, at A6 (discussing spread of SARS); China's Countryside on Alert for SARS, PEOPLE'S
DAILY, Apr. 25, 2003 (emphasizing preventative measures in rural China), available at
http://us.tom.com/english/3824.htm;JoshuaMuldavin,China's Poor Left Behind, INT'L HERALD
TRIBUNE, May 8, 2003, at 6 (commenting onhealthcare in rural China).
94. See infra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing relatively "liberal" institutional
reforms).
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international observers worried about whether Chinese authorities had the will
and skill to take swift significant steps forward or to sustain the heightened
vigilance attained in 2002-2003.95 The quick compromise or erosion of even the
modest bans or restrictions on the consumption of suspected animals was, in this
respect, a bad sign.96 When the 2004 lunar near year arrived, few restrictions
were in place and travel resumed at the normal peak-season level.97 In the
period since SARS's initial outbreak (and largely for unrelated reasons),
restrictions on migrant laborers had been eased somewhat, creating even greater
mobility.98 China, and the world, have been left to watch and hope that luck and
somewhat enhanced monitoring measures would be sufficient to avert the
occurrence of what was feared in 2003.
The story of the spread and threatened spread of SARS in 2002-2003 and
the prospect for its return-and the relatively rapid spread of information about
SARS within China in 2002-2003-reflect the very changed internal order of
reform-era China. Just as SARS spread internationally from China as a result of
. legal and policy measures and related economic changes that integrated China
with the outside world, so too SARS could spread and threaten to spread
devastatingly within China precisely because liberalizing changes in law and
policy that have made it far easier for Chinese to move about their own country.
Examples include: removing state rationing of basic necessities, allowing the
erosion of an almost serf-like residency permit system, tolerating and fostering
inter-provincial or national markets for employment, and generating the wealth
and leisure-highly unequally distributed-that have permitted a boom in
domestic travel and tourism within the more developed regions and between
those regions and backward areas. Chinese had become greatly freer of legal
and practical restrictions on their ability to move about the country. And
exercises of such freedom to travel spiraled dangerously upward amid the SARS
crisis because of aspects of the greater openness and relative political relaxation
also made the spread of information about SARS much less containable than it
once would have been.
Changes in law, policy, and practice that have taken hold inside China
during the era of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin rendered untenable once-
common strategies of information control, popular repression, and Maoist-style
campaign. Competition for readers among state-controlled PRC print media,
norms of freer expression in Chinese society, the advent of the internet, wireless
communication, and access to foreign news sources have decimated the Party-
95. See Lilt Qi Urges Control of Sars Spread, Xinhua News Agency, May 1, 2003 (discussing
response of the Chinese government), availble at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, Xinhua General News
Service File.
96. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g, China's Lunar New Year Travel Period Takes Off Amid SARS Fears, AGENCE FR.
PRESSE, Jan. 7,2004 (describing general but mixed exhortations to authorities to guard against SARS
but reporting no apparent effect on travel patterns and volume), available at 2004 WL 55607411.
98. See, e.g., China to Remove Obstacles for Migrant Workers, BUSINESS DAILY UPDATE, Aug.
25, 2003 (discussing eased restrictions on mobility for migrant workers), available at 2003 WL
60121872.
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state's former near-monopoly over widely disseminated information. In this
environment, it was little wonder that word about the initial SARS outbreak in
Guangdong reached many interested Chinese, despite an attempted official news
blackout and despite the possible risk of official, even criminal sanctions.
Millions of effectively untraceable text messages to cellphones and countless e-
mails and web-postings spread the word. Once the official denials began to
crack, relatively open and critical reports appeared in unofficial PRC media that
have attracted wide audiences because of their willingness to push the
boundaries of officially acceptable content.
Along with the PRC leadership's decision to undertake a degree of
international cooperation with the WHO and others came the regime's
acknowledgement at home that China did indee'd face a SARS crisis similar to
that depicted in international accounts and critiques. Many foreign assessments
of causation and assignments of blame for the SARS crisis quickly focused on
legal and governmental failings in the contagion's place of origin. Just as critics
and reformers attributed the Asian economic ills of the later 1990s to such
factors,99 their counterparts in the SARS crisis have found fault with Beijing's
characteristic reaction of secrecy and denial, the weakness of legal and
bureaucratic mechanisms for reporting, screening, quarantining, or otherwise
stemming the disease's spread, and the PRC's creaky public health
infrastructure. lOO
After months of silence and denial, PRC government officials and official
PRC newspapers began to join this chorus in April and May of 2003. They
declared SARS to be a serious problem and conceded the authorities' lack of
effectiveness in dealing with it. The newly-installed acting Mayor of Beijing,
Wang Qishan, told a television audience, "SARS is an epidemic that has hit us
head-on."101 Premier Wen Jiabao, himself in his first weeks in office, was quoted
in the official media describing SARS as a grave threat. The director of China's
Center for Disease Control said abjectly, though in a remark not much reported
domestically, that "we ... apologize to everyone. "102
Having admitted a SARS problem in Beijing and Guangdong, a SARS
threat nationally, and a mishandling of the crisis's initial phases, the leadership
on April 20 sacked the Minister of Health Zhang Wenkang and the Mayor of
Beijing Meng Xuenong-two officials with jurisdiction over areas whence the
99. See generally supra note 10; NICHOLAS KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUN ',THu DER FROM THE
EAST (Alfred A. Knopf ed. 2000) (discussing factors leading to the economic crisis of 1997).
100. See Joseph Kahn, The World: Communist Accommodation; When Crises Slrike, China's
Leaders Adapt 10 Survive, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2003, § 4, at 5 (discussing governmental response); Erik
Eckholm, As Cases Mount, Chinese Officials Try to Calm a Panicky Public, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,2003,
at AlO (reporting on the government's responsiveness); Christopher Horton, SARS and AIDS: What
the People Don't Know, ASIA TIMES GNU E, Apr. 24. 2003, at http://www.atimes.comJatimes/
China/ED24Ad03.html (noting parallels between governmental response to AIDS & SARS).
101. Eckholm, As Cases Mount, supra note 100, at AlO.
102. Susan V. Lawrence, For the Top, Sorry is the Hardest Word to Say on SARS. FAR E. ECON.
REV., Apr. 17,2003, at 26.; Joseph Kahn, China Discovers Secrecy is Expensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13,
2003, § 4, at 7.
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problems arose. While this much might have been standard procedure in an
earlier era, what followed was a little less so and pointed to possibly increased
levels of openness and accountability in Chinese Party-state behavior. China's
rulers appear to have been careful to place the ousted officials' authority and
additional powers to address the SARS issue in the hands of those whose
comparative advantage lay in their competence and reputation (although they
were of course already powerful and politically well-connected as well). Vice
Premier and former Foreign Trade Minister Wu Yi was appointed to serve
concurrently as Minister of Health as well as head of a special SARS task force,
and Wang Qishan was brought in as the capital's acting mayor. Both were
widely regarded as highly skilled, smart and part of the group of exceptionally
skilled officials associated with recently retired Premier Zhu Rongji-a group
that had fared especially badly in the recent round of appointments to top
leadership posts.
As a Deputy Mayor of Beijing, Wu had proven her crisis management skills
by keeping key power plants running in the capital amid the unrest that followed
the suppression of the Tiananmen Movement in 1989. Wu also was particularly
well-known to foreign government leaders-and generally respected by them-
from her central, forceful and, on many accounts, forthright role in China's
negotiations to enter the WTO. Her association with the WTO accession
process had meant considerable prest~ge. and a high profile at home as well,
because official media and others had greatly stressed the importance of WTO
m'embership and the political and economic significance to the nation of China's
securing entry into the global trading body that was perhaps second only to the
U.N. in importance and perhaps ahead of it in actual power. Wang too was well-
known at home and abroad for tackling competently some particularly difficult
missions to deal with economic and governmental failings in key potential
trouble-spots around China. Notably, one of his assignments had been to clean
up the mess created by "wild east" financial dealings in Guangdong province in
the 1990s which, among other things, had led to the notorious and costly
bankruptcy of the state-owned, provincial t1agship international investment
vehicle, the Guangdong International Trade and Investment Company.103 On
optimistic or expansive readings, the personnel changes could be seen as going
beyond the scapegoating that had characterized similar moves in the past, and as
perhaps promising to impose higher standards of government service in the
public interest (ones that might not be so easily evaded by relying on personal or
103. See China Creates SARS Task Force, Special Fund, XIHUNA NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 24, 2003
(reporting China's decision to name Wu Yi as head of SARS task force), available at 2003 WL
18800494; John Pomfret, [n a Crisis, China Turns 10 a Familiar Face; Woman who Calmed Panic After
Tiananmen Square Crackdown to Lead SARS Efforts, WASl-I. POST, May 6, 2003, at A17 (discussing
appointment of Wu Yi as leader of SARS efforts); Eckho!m, As Cases Mount, supra note 100. at AlO
(describing efforts by newly appointed mayor Wang Qishan): David Lague, The SARS Outbreak: An
III Wind That Blows Through Politics, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 8, 2003, at 30 (noting political fallout
for Communist Party's failure to effectively handle SARS outbreak); Allen T. Cheng, Crisis Cruncher
who Leads the Pack, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 9, 2003, at 14 (commenting on Wu Yi's leadership
during the SARS crisis).
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factional ties).104
Expectation or hope that SARS reflected and encouraged a serious and
potentially enduring turn to openness, transparency, or accountability also drew
from the apparent prospect of support from China's top leadership, which
remains indispensable to significant change on politically sensitive issues. The
recently installed occupants of China's highest formal offices and the nation's
newly anointed next-generation leaders, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen
Jiabao, took highly visible public roles in acknowledging and managing the crisis
and personifying the new open style. Wen darted about Beijing, dining with
students at SARS-affected universities, visiting hospitals and urging on medical
staffers and public health personnel, and touring construction sites, shopping
malls, and residential neighborhoods. Hu personally inspected the SARS-
affected city of Tianjin, some of the most crowded areas of Guangzhou
(Guangdong's largest city) and Shenzhen, the boomtown abutting Hong Kong.
Press accounts recorded the two leaders expressing great concern about the
SARS problem and mortal determination to rise to the challenge and overcome
the initial inadequacies of the government's response. lOS Television coverage
followed suit and, in a rather unusual move, broadcast extensive clips of the
leaders' comments (rather than newscaster-read summaries). Especially in the
early days after their appointments, acting Mayor Wang and Minister Wu played
second-tier versions of Hu and Wen's roles.
While this leadership behavior too (and saturating media coverage of it)
broadly fit a familiar template in Chinese politics (including leaders' visits to the
"frontlines" of the battle or "model units" for a new policy), it suggested
something a bit different in the current context. Rumors circulated that the
nominally retired President and Party chie.f Jiang Zemin (and perhaps some of
his closest followers among the newly installed leadership) had decamped from
Beijing to the perceived safety of Shanghai. Aside from Jiang's playing down the
seriousness of SARS in his principal public comment addressing the issue (in a
meeting with a visiting Indian cabinet minister), there was a striking near-silence
on the SARS issue from Jiang, his most highly placed close protege Vice
President Zeng Qinghong, and (to a lesser degree) Jiang's other key acolytes on
the new Standing Committee. In this context, and at what may have been a
sharply divided mid-April Politburo meeting on SARS policy, Hu and Wen may
have taken significant political risks in embracing and pushing a line of relative
openness and candor at home and transparency and cooperation abroad. I06
104. See, e.g., Open Apology by CPC Provincial Leader on Accident Captures Public Attention,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 20, 2004 (describing official taking public responsibility for disaster as
reflecting the continuing effect on government accountability and norms of officials' sense of duty of
Health Minister's and Beijing mayor's dismissal during the SARS crisis), available at LEXIS, Newsfile
Library, Asia/Pacific News.
105. See Chinese New Government Acts Responsibly in Combat Against SARS, Xl HUA NEWS
AGENCY, Apr. 29, 2003 (discussing response of newly installed government), available at 2003 WL
20000072.
106. Erik Eckholm, Possible Next Patient: The Chinese Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at
A20 (exploring response of different party members); Mark O'Neill, Home Truths, S. CHINA
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The personal moves of top leaders, the personnel moves just below the top
level, the admission of a SARS problem generally, and moves to cooperate with
the WHO were presented to audiences inside the PRC as part of a shift toward
openness and critical content in what ordinary Chinese saw and heard from their
government and the communications organs it controlled. Even against the
background of Chinese media that have become a good deal livelier and freer in
recent years, the SARS coverage stood out for how far it went in acknowledging
or implying that there were indeed serious errors in the regime's response, and
even that these might reflect systemic flaws. China's many savvy readers surely
saw the concession of significant shortcomings at high and low levels when they
learned of the Politburo's April canning of the Minister of Health and the mayor
of Beijing and when they heard of stern directives to local officials to provide
accurate and timely reports of SARS outbreaks (which, this implied, they had
not been doing).
No such relatively subtle inferences were necessary, however. The principal
Party organ, People's Daily, conceded that China's disease prevention system
had been shown to be inadequate and ill-prepared. 107 Articles in other
prominent papers criticized as "habitual" behavior under the existing system
officials' hiding, delaying, and impeding reports of the SARS problem, and
endorsed assessments that SARS made clear the government's failures in "crisis
management" and the dangerous i~balances created by many years of one-
sidedly emphasizing economic development and the market over social
development and government responsibilities. 108 Other official media asked why
the public health authorities in Beijing and other northern cities had been so ill-
prepared, slow to respond, and ill-informed when the disease had been spreading
in Guangdong for at least three months. The answers offered included local
officials' reflexive reaction to try to keep crises quiet, in part to avoid adverse
effects on the local economy.l09 Television talk shows and news programs were
saturated with comments and stories that disclosed serious SARS problems and
poor government handling. Media of all sorts kept up a constant drumbeat of
SARS coverage, including daily SARS counts that indicated considerable
openness about bad news but that hardly inspired confidence that the regime
was effective in bringing the problem under control.
To be sure, officially mandated or tolerated exposes of corruption and other
failures in the system and repudiations of policies and positions held by those
who have fallen from power within the system have been relatively common
MORNING POST, May 20, 2003, at 11 (concerning Jiang rumors).
107. See SARS-An Opportunity Reshuffles Public Health, Disease Prevention System, PEOPLE'S
DAILY, May 3,2003 (describing China's disease prevention system as ill-prepared to handle sudden
SARS outbreak), available at hnp://english.people.com.cn/200305/03/eng20030S03_116188.shtm!.
108. See Joseph Kahn, Some Chinese Say Government Response to Epidemic Has Been Too
Heavy-Handed, N.Y. TltvIES, May 23, 2003, at AS (criticizing governmental response); Three Big Fallirs
Lead to SARS Creating a Crisis, ZHO 'GGUO JINGJI BAO, May 26, 2003; Ten Polilical Scientisrs and
Economisls Discuss: China Will Change from This, XINWEN ZHOUKAN, May 9, 2003.
109. See Hailong, supra note 91. (citing economic concern as the reason for initial government
concealment of SARS crisis).
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place, but, as the foregoing suggests, the SARS coverage went further in
suggesting shortcomings of the system. These are a good deal more novel and,
on optimistic readings, possible harbingers of significant shift toward openness,
public accountability, and tolerance of criticism, especially given that they came
in the context of commenting on a specific policy crisis and not in the safer
setting of abstract discussions of reform.
The "liberal" or "optimistic" reading also drew some support from the fact
that a key trigger for the regime's abandoning attempts at cover-up and denial
was the action of a whistleblower who went unpunished despite his temerity.
When the PRC's official line held that there were only a dozen SARS cases and
three fatalities in the Chinese capital, Dr. Jiang Yanyong, a retired PLA
physician, told foreign news media that there were sixty infections and seventeen
deaths at one Beijing military hospital. 110 Six weeks later, PRe media
acknowledged the doctor's role in prompting a change in the government's line
and apparent calls within the Party to sanction him encountered sharp
resistance.]]]
Discussion of the need for transparency- and accountability-enhancing
political reforms (some having what might be called a quasi-constitutional
quality) and legal reforms followed. Extensive discussion in the Chinese press
and among influential policy intellectuals of the public's "right to know" also
emerged in the reaction to the SARS cover up and provided a foundation for
pushing and extending the "transparency" agenda that the new Hu-Wen
leadership had sketched before SARS.l 12 Openly and widely published
commentaries saw in the Party-state's all-too-eviden t failings in coping with
SARS the basis for a significant shift in the relationship between ruler and ruled,
with the regime having to tolerate more systematic public criticism from a public
that had become less willing to rely upon (much lest trust in) the Party and state
to solve major problems.1 13 Other media commentaries and comments from the
1l0. Elisabeth Rosenthal, A Beijing Doctor Questions Daca on Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,2003,
at A8.
Ill. Allen T. Cheng, Doctor Who Exposed Cover-Up Wins Official Recognition, S. CHI A
MORNING POST, May 17, 2003, at 3; Jason Leow, Encouragemenr for China's SARS Whistle-Blower,
STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), June 9, 2003.
ll2. Discussions of the right to know included commentaries printed in Shanghai's Wenhui Bao,
Beijing's Xing Baa and nascent policy prescriptions by highly placed intellectuals. See generally Susan
Lawrence, The Plague Reaches Much Deeper, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 1,2003, at 26 (stating that
political accountability and the public's right to be informed are key concepts [or new leadership);
Susan Lawrence, Leadership: How to Fail the People: The New Leaders Promised Betler, But Did
Worse than Their Elders in Their Firsl Big Crisis, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 24, 2003, at 26 (reporting
that concerns about China's economy and reputation inhibited timely and open communication about
SARS); Benjamin Morgan, After SARS, China's Media on Longer Leash But Stil! Under State Control,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, June 17, 2003 (discussing China's changing media policies in light of SARS
crisis). See also Mei Zu, Legislate 10 Safeguard the Public's RighI to Know, TA KUNG PAO, June 26,
2003 (discussing media reform efforts from a pro-PRC Hong Kong perspective); Hailong, supra note
91 (suggesting openness and transparency as an effective means of combating the spread of SARS).
113. As one prominent newspaper (the Twenty-First Century Economic Herald) put it, the old
"model" of an "all-powerful government" could no longer be relied upon in China's rapidly changing
society. As one reformist scholar put it, the SARS "disaster" should make Chinese leaders "more
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premier and other officials emphasized the need for laws and policies to attend
to the needs of "social development" or "human development." On these views,
the needed reforms meant moving away from the one-sided emphasis on
economic development that had left China ill-prepared for coping with SARS
and seduced local officials into costly attempts to cover up the disease. 114 SARS
czar Wu Yi identified reliance on law, transparent policymaking, democratic
decision-making, and an improved public health infrastructure as keys to success
in addressing SARS.l15
Since the end of the 2002-2003 SARS episode, the PRC has undertaken
and, more often, contemplated numerous legal and other related changes that
could embody Wu Yi's dictum or extend the turn toward greater transparency,
openness, and accountability that emerged during the crisis.
Unofficial sources seized on the recognition that poor public access to
information had worsened SARS and pressed for furthering the newly much-
discussed "right to know" through reforms in media law and policy. Leading
academics pressed openly for measures to expand and secure reporters' freedom
to write about SARS, other public health threats, and other issues of similar
public concern, and to gain greater access to information over which the
government and Party have maintained a monopoly. Such proposals sought to
u'se the SARS effect to build on Premier Wen Jiabao's mid-SARS crisis
statement urging the State Council (~he PRC's council of ministers and chief
collective executive organ) to show greater openness toward the news media.
Yet, legal reforms on this front remained in, at most, an incipient stage many
months after the SARS crisis had passed in China. Official and quasi-official
research institutes had been tasked with studying the issue and a proposal for a
regulation on "government information openness" reportedly had been
circulated to relevant government entities and advisors. 116
Reinforcement of SARS-prompted government reporting and containment
modest" and "sharpen the people's critical sense." The Party Central Committee's private polling
data reportedly show considerable sharpening of that critical sense. with the Party's stock dropping to
levels not seen since the Tiananmen Incident of 1989. See generally Kahn, Heavy-Handed, supra note
108 (describing the effect of SARS on China's political and international relations); Erik Eckholm,
Rude Awakening, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,2003, at Al (describing the effect of SARS on China's political
and international relations).
114. See China's Premier Elaborates on Post-SARS Tasks, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June 29,
2003 (reporting Jiabao's address), available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, Asia/Pacific News; Chinese
President Owlines Priorities for Studying Party Ideology, BBC MONITORING ASIA PAClnc, Jan. 30,
2004 (outlining presidential thoughts), available ar 2004 WL 64204569; Three Big Faulrs Lead to SARS
Creating a Crisis, supra note 108; Ten Political Scientists and Economists Discuss: China Will Change
from This, supra note 108; Hailong, supra note 91 (stating that economic concerns influenced
government's lack of communication about SARS).
115. See Chinese Health Minister Urges Continuing "Anti-SARS Spirit," NEW CHINA NEWS
AGENCY, July 29, 2003, (reporting minister's address to national working group on public health).
116. See Mei, supra note 112 (interviewing noted scholars on the need to reform dealings with the
media); Morgan, supra note 112 (evaluating changing government policies toward the media); China
Mulls Giving More Information to Media, Public, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, July 29, 2003 (describing
government initiative to increase open communication with the media). available at 2003 WL
69297587.
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measures was on the agenda as well, with SARS being added to the list of
communicable diseases warranting notice and action under the law on
communicable diseases, the Ministry of Health resuming (amid new rumored
cases) its practice (begun during the SARS crisis) of regular public reports of the
number of SARS cases, and Wang Qishan more broadly pledging "procedures to
make government affairs transparent" and "encourag[ing] officials to speak
more to the public and the media."117 Directives to local government entities
mandated continuing monitoring, reporting, and control of SARS and other
communicable diseases at the enhanced level that SARS had prompted.1l8
SARS-inspired changes to the principal relevant statute, the 1989 Law on
the Prevention and Treatment of Communicable Diseases, were slated for
enactment at the first post-SARS crisis session of the National People's Congress
in March 2004. But the proposed amendments (prepared primarily by the
Ministry of Health) reportedly became bogged down in debates among positions
that mostly were favorable or, at least neutral, toward the agenda of greater
transparency, openness, and de-politicization in the handling of public health
issues. These reportedly included primarily tactical or relatively technical
questions such as: whether the CDC should be raised to cabinet-level status
(which would enhance its individual clout but which might reduce its support
from other, more established and powerful bureaucratic actors, such as the
Ministry of Health, now headed by the formidable Wu Yi and promised a
significant post-SARS increase in resources); whether to rely primarily on
general provisions (which might be too vague or difficult to apply to specific
diseases presen ting very different public health and administrative challenges) or
to adopt a more detailed and fragmented law addressing individual diseases or
types of diseases (which could risk adminis.trative confusion or omissions similar
to that which some critics saw as slowing the response to SARS); whether the
decision to release information about an outbreak of a covered disease should
remain centralized (which could permit more effective control over the quality
and comparability of data and help to coordinate responses, but at some risk of
delay and possible underreporting if local mayors or governors resisted
disclosure of potentially embarrassing and economically harmful information to
a specialized and traditionally not very powerful central health ministry) or
should become more decentralized (which could encourage more rapid
dissemination of time-sensitive information but which created greater risks of
inaccurate and unstandardized information, might make attempts to cover up
117. See HaiJong, Sllpra note 91 (calling for openness and transparency of information); Ministry
TO Publicized Epidemic Reports from 2004, Financial Times Information, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, Dec.
31,2003 (explaining the type of public health information to be publicized by the Ministry of Health);
Tan Guoqi. Equal Efforts Urged for the Prevention of Both Flu and SARS, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Sep. 10,2003 (discussing governmental reporting efforts), available at 2003 WL 56899086; Beijing New
Mayor Strives for Administrative Transparency, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, Feb. 23, 2004 (reporting newly
elected mayor's goal to make government affairs more transparent), available at LEXIS, Newsfile
Library, Asia/Pacific News.
118. See China in Bailie Agairzst Bird Flu, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 30, 2004 (noting
response to bird flu), available at 2004 WL 65923523.
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disease outbreaks even more widespread, and could leave local officials without
adequate guidance as they tried to navigate between provisions that prohibited
inaccurate disclosures and mandated timely disclosures of information). To
address this last problem, some more radical reform proposals argued
(unsuccessfully so far) that the Law on State Secrets needed to be amended to
remove the prospect of criminal sanctions, at least for those who disclosed
accurate public health information without authorization.119
The new Regulations on Responding to Public Health Emergencies
adopted in the midst of the SARS outbreak were depicted as an example and a
key component in the regime's adopting of policies of reliance on scientific
methods, and transparent, responsible, and rational governance to address the
SARS threat. 120
The SARS crisis also sharpened efforts to address shortcomings in China's
patchwork of laws and regulations governing "emergency situations" more
generally. Here too, the general thrust of SARS-related proposed reforms was
broadly liberal and pro-transparency. The existing framework faced criticism for
. being too skewed toward martial law responses (rather than merely
'administrative or preventative measures), and for being ill-suited to handling a
public health emergency (rather than political upheaval), as the SARS episode
amply had demonstrated. These issues were among the concerns that motivated
a 2004 constitutional amendment to defi.ne a "state of emergency" generally and
to provide the foundation for a planned emergency law. Such still-pending
legislation, its drafters and proponents pledged, would be more suited to the
problems posed by outbreaks of serious diseases, natural disasters, catastrophic
accidents, severe economic crises and the like, and would help avoid the poor
flow of information and lack of transparency that had hindered the initial
response to SARS.121 Others argued that even an improved law still likely would
fall short on these scores and would be a less appropriate and effective way to
address public health crises than would a proper set of public health and
communicable disease laws.
Still other post-SARS crisis regulatory and related policy reforms sought to
enhance the public health and health care systems' capacity to prevent and
. contain disease outbreaks without resorting to illiberal or authoritarian
119. Some of the specific information in this paragraph is derived from personal and not-for-
attribution discussions with PRC nationals involved in the law and public health sectors. It is fully
consistent with recognized patterns of Chinese political and legislative behavior and with materials
about the response to SARS available in the public record and cited throughout this article, including
in Law Amendment on Free Medical Treatment Planned, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 16, 2003, and
China Amends Anti-Epidemic Law After SARS Outbreak, BUS[NESS DAILY UPDATE, June 16,2003.
120. See Huang Guozhu & Jia Yong, From 1998 Flood Fight to the Fight Against SARS, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, June 1, 2003 (comparing China's response to 1998 flood to that of SARS crisis),
available at LEXIS. Newsfile Library, Asia/Pacific News.
121. See, e.g., China's First Emergency Law in Pipeline, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 6, 2004
(discussing proposed amendment to China's Constitution to include Emergency Law): China to
Improve Emergency Response System, U ITED PRESS INT'l, Mar. 10, 2004 (reporting pending
legislation).
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measures. Examples include: more demanding regulations from the PRC's
Environmental Protection Administration governing the handling of hospital
waste water, internal directives from the Ministry of Health to local
administrators on how to improve the diagnosis and handling of SARS and
febrile patients, and enhanced measures by the Ministry and others to improve
the training and the quantity of relevant staff. 122 Among the changes at issue in
revising the Law on the Prevention and Treatment of Communicable Diseases
were measures to provide free treatment and compensation for victims of SARS
and other communicable diseases, as had been done with SARS during the crisis.
(Reportedly, such reforms faced an impasse over issues related to scope and cost
of compensation, including the range of covered diseases, the extent of
reimbursable local health agencies' costs, and the inclusion of quarantine-related
costs and losses). Over the longer term, PRC officials formulated a multi-year
plan to devote more resources and to establish a more effective administrative
system for dealing with public health emergencies, disease prevention and
monitoring, the public health needs of rural areas, primary care needs in urban
areas, public hygiene, public health education and research, and public health
law enforcement. 123
Other measures suggesting a broadly liberal and transparency-favoring shift
in official approaches to public health issues included top leaders' public
appearance with members of China's under-acknowledged group of HIV
positive and AIDS-stricken individuals and proposals for legal and other
measures addressing forms of discrimination against infectious disease victims-
principally HIV/AIDS sufferers but potentially also those who have been
infected with SARS and faced discrimination. 124
What do the seemingly liberal or transparency- and accountability-
122. See China Tightens Law of Hospital Sewage Disposal to Stop Spread of Diseases, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 29, 2004 (discussing new laws on hospital waste disposal); Chinese Health
Ministry Issues Circular on SARS Prevention, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 23, 2003 (discussing
governmental initiatives regarding fever clinics), available at 2003 WL 69242015; China is Better
Prepared Against SARS, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 16,2003 (discussing reforms), available at 2003
WL 69804473.
123. See, e.g., Public Health System in Urgent Need of Overhaul, Financial Times Information
Service, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, Mar. 10,2004 (describing the history of China's public health service
system), available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, Asia/Pacific News; Law Amendment on Free Medical
Treatment Planned, supra note 119 (describing proposed amendment which would provide free
medical treatment for specified infectious diseases); China's First University Department of Health
Economics, Management Opens, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 8,2003 (announcing establishment of
Department of Health Economics and Management at Beijing University); Chinese Premier Urges
Strengthening Public Health System, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June 17, 2003, (reporting Chinese
premier's plans to improve public health system). See also Chinese Parliament Discusses Vice-Premier
Wu Yi's SARS Report, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June 20, 2003 (describing April 25 National People's
Congress meeting favorable discussion of State Council's decision to establish a special Anti-SARS
administrative unit and a RMB 2 billion special fund for preventing and treating SARS).
124. See, e.g., Experts Give Legal Suggestions on China's AIDS Problem, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Nov. 11,2003 (discussing need for improvement of Chinese laws on AIDS prevention and
control); Keith Bradsher, Now, the SARS Emotional Toll, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2003, at A16
(describing the emotional impact on SARS victims).
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promoting elements in the Chinese reaction and the Chinese regime's responses
on the domestic front to the SARS crisis of 2002-2003 tell us about their
foundations and, therefore, their likely persistence and importance?
On one view, they represent a response to a crisis, driven by the exigencies
of a transient moment and the peculiarities of the period's elite politics, which
mean that it may, or may not, be of lasting effect. Leadership transitions, of the
sort that was underway in China at the time SARS struck, can be occasions of
policy innovation in the PRC as insecure heirs apparent and challengers struggle
for stature and influence. Some in China-watching circles perceived a split
among the top elite between leaders closely associated with nominally retired
President and Party leader Jiang Zemin, on one side, and Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabo,
and a cadre of people associated with the previous reformist Premier Zhu
Rongji, on the other. On this view, the mid-April Politburo meeting marked a
victory for members of the latter alliance who pushed for a more open and
cooperative approach at home and abroad, both because they thought it was
good policy and because crafting a distinctive policy line was an established
medium of elite conflict. In addition to presenting a genuine crisis which the Hu-
Wen leadership appears to have believed required the policy line they pressed,
the SARS mess created, on this view, opportunities for Hu and Wen to wield
. decisively and visibly the power that they formally held and thereby move
'beyond Jiang's shadow on a Politburo that had been packed with Jiang's
proteges and members of his so-called 'Shanghai faction. From this perspective,
substantive disagreements and struggles for power reinforced one another to
oust a Health Minister who had been Jiang's personal physician, to extract a self-
criticism from Jiang associate and Beijing Vice Mayor and Party secretary Liu
Qi, to expose a dangerous cover-up in hospitals run by the one institution that
Jiang still formally headed (the PLA), to raise the profile of Wu Yi, Wang
Qishan, and other members of the cohort of Zhu mentorees that included
Premier Wen, and so on.125
It remains uncertain whether the post-SARS developments will bring
lasting change in an era of a still-ongoing leadership transition and bounded
conflict over the seemingly divisive SARS issue. However sharp intra-elite
divisions may have been over how to handle SARS, they were ultimately
125. See John Pomfret, Outbreak Gave China's Hu an Opening; President Responded to Pressure
Inside and Outside Country on SARS, WASH. POST, May 13,2003, at Al Quxtaposing response of Hu
and Zemin); Paul Lin, China's Leaders Playing Politics with Health, TAIPEI TIMES, May 1,2003, at 8
(questioning forthrightness of Chinese leadership during SARS); Lawrence Brahm, SARS and the
. Coming-of-Age of China's New Leaders, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 5, 2003, at 13 (suggesting
: China's leaders capitalize on SARS crisis to shift government focus from economics to humanity);
Roderick MacFarquhar, Unhealthy Politics, NEWSWEEK INT'L, May 12,2003, at 26 (criticizing Chinese
leadership for focusing on politics instead of people); Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Lessons from China's SARS
Debacle, CNN.com, Apr. 24, 2003, (I{ http://edition.cnn.coml2003/WORLD/asiapcUeastJ
04/2l!willy.column/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) (expressing skepticism about new leadership's ability to
deliver on promise for open communication without more thorough reforms); Pery Link, Will SARS
Transform China's Chiefs?, TIME ASIA, Apr. 28, 2003 (describing the way Chinese leadership handles
distribution of information), available at http://www.time.comltime/asia/covers/501030505/viewpoint.
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disagreements over tactics and not strategy, and thus were not obviously
freighted with the potential to produce radical policy reorientations. There
surely was unanimity over the goals of containing the outbreak (especially once
it began to strike uncomfortably close to the leadership), minimizing economic
damage, and avoiding drastic losses of confidence in the Chinese regime at home
or abroad. Moreover, while moments of elite leadership transition in China can
create space and incentives for staking out new approaches, moments of
significant discontinuity have been few and may not include the recent smooth
and managed transition. And they can have a more conservative or even
reactionary impact when a nascent leadership group may be unsure of its agenda
and wary of offending only-nominally-retired senior colleagues. This suggests a
likely retreat from any significantly reformist SARS-inspired agenda as the
moment of crisis-and the opportunity to capitalize on it politically-passes, and
arguments against reforms that might upset or injure long-standing systems
resurface.
On other analytical perspectives, there was clearly something more
substantive and potentially significant going on. 126 At the elite level, whatever
behind-the-scenes machinations transpired, the politics of transition contributed
to the entrenchment of Hu's and Wen's commitment to relative openness about
the SARS problem, criticism of regime failings, and cooperation with the
international community. This approach dovetailed with the broader images the
two had already begun to cultivate as-compared to PRC baselines-populist,
responsive, and accessible leaders. Moreover, Hu and Wen quickly became
publicly identified with their line on SARS, and thus could not easily turn back,
given the likely costs to newly in-place leaders of reversing a major policy that
addressed a crucial issue and that may have come at the expense of still-powerful
rivals.
At a more institutional and structural level, it was possible that the SARS
crisis lastingly boosted already-percolating elite and reformist intellectual
agendas for moderate, moderating changes within the system. Relatively
narrowly, the obvious shortcomings in the handling of SARS had produced some
significant (if not yet implemented or entrenched) measures to expand the
material resources and enhance the political and legal clout of public health
institutions and of public health "experts" or "professionals." Those
bureaucratic and personnel constituencies typically have favored a more liberal
and transparent approach to public health problems. Not surprisingly, then tend
to stress disclosure, education, and treatment. They have been very critical of
economic growth-focused or habitually secretive officials' tendencies to conceal
vital information. And they have been skeptical about the efficacy and
defensibility of containment or quarantine-based strategies.
More broadly, long-circulating policy or law reform ideas-including so-
126. See, e.g., Laurence Brahm, China Heads into a New Cycle of Reform, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, June 8, 2003, at 11 (proposing SARS as a turning point in Chinese politics); Allen T. Cheng,
Infected by Openness, S. CHINA MORNING POST, JuI. 3, 2003, at 14 (arguing that lessons from SARS
will lead to greater government transparency).
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called "intra-Party democracy," gradual extension of competItIOn in local
elections, and enhanced private property rights benefiting the new
entrepreneurial and middle classes (who are fast becoming an articulate and
assertive social group with, as yet, a non-radical agenda)-sound like plausible,
relatively safe medicine for treating the SARS-revealed ailments of a
bureaucracy that instinctively withheld whatever information it was not clearly
required to report, and that could be so secretive because it was so
unaccountable.
Although it has not yet generated much, it remains possible that SARS'
exposure of the wretched state of the disease control and public health
infrastructure may have a modestly liberalizing impact on substantive policy
agendas by offering particularly compelling evidence of the costs (including the
potential economic costs) of emphasizing growth at the expense of a variety of
public goods upon which the well-being-including the wealth-of China
depends. The emphasis of "social" and "human" development needs and the
imperatives to balance those with, or incorporate them in, the agenda of
economic development pointed to an inchoate agenda to address SARS-related
challenges and problems rooted in part in broad social features that Chinese
leaders and many commentators appeared to recognize. 127
As this suggests, the liberalization-transparency-accountability dimension of
the analysis of, and response to, SARS might operate at the level of state-society
relations as well. The regime's capacity to resort to draconian and mass-
mobilizational methods to deal with a crises had been lastingly undercut by
contemporary China's peculiar combination of mass skepticism concerning the
regime's intentions and capacity, and mass acceptance of a social contract that
trades citizens' acquiescence in authoritarianism for their rulers' abandonment of
Stalinist and Maoist excesses and delivery of rising standards of living. As
numerous reported statements of ordinary PRC citizens and the massive SARS-
fear-induced exodus from Beijing indicated, many Chinese were dismissive of
official denials of a serious SARS problem, unlikely to rally behind the regime's
calls to stay put and trust in its methods of quarantine and monitoring, and
confident that most would be able to avoid sanctions for flouting or shirking
their rulers' commands and exhortations.
Moreover, the festering problems of the many millions whom China's long
reform-era economic boom has so far left behind have created pressures for
innovative and potentially risky policies. It is widely acknowledged that the PRC
leadership must come to grips with the needs and demands of this group,
composed primarily of residents of inland provinces, agrarian regions, and
employees of rust-belt state-owned industries in some of China's less prosperous
127. See, e.g., Ren Zhongping, Sublimation of the Practice of Building a Well-off Society in All-
Around Wayan Concept of Development, Concept of Polirical Achievements, Concept of Qualified
Personnel and Concept of Masses, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Jan. 12,2004 (describing balance of socio-political
needs in SARS policies), availbale at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, Global News Wire File (Under China:
People's Daily Outlines "Four Concepts" of Parry Policy). See also supra notes 112-15 and
accompanying text (describing "social" or "human" development needs).
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and modern cities. China's top leaders have realized this and face partly self-
imposed rising expectations. Jiang Zemin propounded a "Go West" policy that
sought to reduce the escalating concentration of investment and growth in
China's prosperous east coast. Jiang's annointed successors face greater
demands and hopes that they will take care of reform's losers in China's
hinterland. Hu's experience in the poor inland areas of Tibet, Guizhou, and
Gansu were thought to make him particularly expert in and sensitive to the
problems of the hinterland. Wen's relatively extensive experience in and with
poor and rural areas raised broadly similar expectations for him, at least
compared to the baseline established by the "Shanghai gang" that had
dominated top positions during the preceding decade or more. Pre-SARS
remarks by both leaders pledged more attention to such concerns, and observers
generally foresee that the problems and risks of instability arising from China's
less developed or declining industrial areas only will become more pressing in
the years ahead when Hu and Wen will have to build and consolidate their
power and rule China.
Because SARS' gravest threat was that it would spread among this
vulnerable and potentially volatile population in China's rural areas, smaller or
less well-prepared cities, and urban migrant underclass, there was an especially
strong imperative for the leadership in general, and Hu and Wen in particular, to
be aggressive in taking on SARS, including by adopting measures at odds with
the demonstrably unsuccessful traditional approaches of information control
followed by attempted quarantine or mobility control. There was also an
impetus to lean toward transparency and cooperation because little else might do
in these parts of China where other SARS-fighting resources are spread so thin
that dissemination of information and acceptance of international assistance may
be among the few available weapons.
VI. SCHIZOPHRENIC AUTHORITARIAN REGIME SYNDROME (II): AUTHORITY
ALWAYS WINS?
Whether or not it proves to be deep or durable, the "liberal" or
"transparent" or "pro-accountability" or "reformist" face of the domestic
approach to the SARS crisis and its aftermath in China came grudgingly and
incompletely. It did not eclipse a very different mode of response strongly
reminiscent of old-style PRC practices. The regime's initial impulse in dealing
with SARS at home was clearly not just to rebuff foreign pressure that might be
deemed to intrude upon China's sovereign discretion in addressing its internal
affairs. The initial response was also to treat relevant information as
presumptively secret and a regime monopoly, and to deny the existence of a
significant SARS problem that officials had known about at least since
November or December of 2003. A week and a half into February, authorities in
Guangzhou were still trying-apparently with the center's tolerance and clearly
with diminishing effect-to restrict the dissemination of news about the outbreak
and to declare it under control. Well into March, Beijing officials were pursuing
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the same strategy.128 The traditional ban on bad or controversial news during
key Party or state meetings quashed the possibility of addressing the matter
publicly until after the conclusion of the March meeting in Beijing of the
National People's Congress (which was the first such session presided over by
Bu Jintao and which appointed Wen Jiabao as premier).
Although he ultimately escaped direct retribution, Beijing SARS whistle-
blower Jiang Yanyong was in peril, targeted by conservative elements that
resented his regime-embarrassing audacity and feared its emulation. Media
reports notably failed to laud other whistleblowers. They also eschewed
prominent coverage of potentially unsettling SARS-related events, including
violent opposition by some city and town to plans to put SARS patients out of
their neighborhoods, or the flight of hundreds of thousands from Beijing, or the
resort to quasi-feudal measures by localities to prevent travelers from suspect
areas entering their jurisdictions. 129
By March 2004, revisionist history seemed to be setting in, expunging-or at
least playing down severely-the early missteps. Premier Wen asserted that the
authorities had "reported the facts of the SARS situation exactly as they were"
· and promptly enforced the Law on the Prevention and Treatment of
· Communicable Diseases, formulating the Regulations on Responding to Public
· Health Emergencies, and classifying SARS as a covered disease. l3O Even earlier,
official commentaries had asserted that, by June 2003, the Chinese Government
had managed to "salvage its international image, ease the people's minds, set up
a public health mechanism, and maintain economic development and weather
the SARS threat. "131
Dr. Jiang's protective halo as an officially praised hero eroded rapidly on
the eve of the National People's Congress' March 2004 consideration of
constitutional reforms. In a move that predictably did not endear him to the
leadership that had so recently endorsed or at least tolerated praise of his role in
exposing the SARS crisis in Beijing and triggering the new transparency, Jiang
called for a reexamination of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Incident (the horrors
128. See Pomfret, supra note 125 (discussing official response); Pneumonia Outbreak Under
Corllrol in Cuangzhou, XINHUA NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 11, 2003 (reporting SARS under control);
Atypical Pneumonia Contained in Beijing: Health Authority, XINHUA NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 26. 2003
· (reporting containment in Beijing): David Lague, Susan V. Lawrence & David Murphy, The China
Vims, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 10.2003, at 12-15 (discussing attempts by officials to limit disclosure
: of information).
129. See Eckholm, supra note 113 (describing the effects of SARS on China's political and
international relations); Ben Dolven & David Murphy. Building New Chinese Walls, FAR E. ECON.
REV.. May 22. 2003, at 24-26 (suggesting increased urgency in Chinese cities to contain disease).
130. See Premier Hails Victory in Fighr Against SARS, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 8,2004
(quoting Wen).
131. See Yang Fan, Never Before has a New Chinese Leadership had co Face Such Enormous
Hardships During the First Six Monrhs in Office, but Hu Jiantao and Company Have Overcome Them
All, Says Beijing Polirical COmmenlalOr, reprinted in FIN. TIMES INFO., June 23. 2003 (discussing
difficulties and triumphs of Chinese leaders), available at LEXIS. Newsfile Library. Global News Wire
File.
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of which he had witnessed as a doctor).132 As that event's fifteenth anniversary
approached, Jiang found himself in the temporary custody that has long befallen
well-known dissidents and "troublemakers" on the eve of politically significant
moments. (The detaining authorities rarely offer-and, under criminal
procedure and other related legal reforms in recent years-rarely could offer a
legal basis for such detentions. The detention of Jiang thus chafes especially
uncomfortably against top leaders' proclamation that reliance on the law and
legal methods have been a vital component in their successful battle against
SARS and its fallout.)
PRC officials and official PRC media included Maoist style exhortation
alongside pallid stabs at expose. The widely read China Youth Daily described
the fight against SARS as a "smokeless war" that has "forged a national
spirit."133 People's Daily opined that, under the "staunch leadership" of the Party
Central Committee and "Comrade Bu Jintao, the whole nation, united as one
man ... has struck up a heroic song featuring the Chinese people's strong will"
and that victory in the "battle" was assured. 134 The media informed the people
that the "strong and correct leadership" of the Party was the key to success.
President Hu called for a "people's war"-a classic Mao-era phrase-against
SARS.135 Some officially sanctioned commentaries analogized the fight against
SARS to the battle against severe floods in 1998 and praised Chinese
Communist Party members who fought the battle as "true examples of the 'three
represents'" (the phrase that represents Jiang Zemin's singular contribution to
the canon of Chinese Communist idoleology).136 Likewise, Hu Jintao, Wen
Jiabao, and Wu Yi joined the chorus of old-style party-praising and citing the
correct and staunch leadership of the Party Central Committee and the State
Council, despite the evident tension with their roles as point persons for the new
transparency and international cooperation·. l3?
Official sources and the official media offered up tales of martyrs in the
fight against SARS that were reminiscent of Mao-era propaganda and that
seemed designed to serves as doppelgangers to the "transparency" hero Dr.
Jiang. The Ministry of Health awarded the honor "Guardian of the People's
132. See, e.g., Jonathan Mirsky, A Leller from a Doctor Who Cannor Forget Tiananl11en, INT'L
HERALD TRIBUNE, March 12, 2004, at 6 (reporting letter sent from Jiang to Senior Chinese leaders).
133. See Kahn, Heavy-Handed, supra note 108, at A8 (quoting China Yourh Daily).
134. See Promoting and Fostering Narional Spirir in Fight Againsr SARS, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Apr.
30, 2003 (reporting president's comments urging unity in fight against SARS), available ar
http://english.people.com.cn/200304/29/eng20030429_116024.shtml.
135. See Presidel1l Hu Calls for 'People's War' Against SARS, PEOPLE'S DAILY, May 2, 2003
(describing president's efforts to use all efforts to eliminate and contain SARS), available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/other/archive.html.
136. Guozhu & Yong, supra note 120 (comparing China's response to 1998 flood to that of SARS
crisis).
137. See Chinese Health Minister Urges Continuing 'Anti-SARS Spirit,' supra note 115 (reporting
comments made by vice premier to encourage fight to end SARS); Premier Hails Victory in Fighr
Againsr SARS, supra note 130 (quoting premier towing party line); Chinese Presidenr Hu lintao Hails
Success of Anti-SARS Drive, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 28, 2003 (quoting Hui Jintao towing party
line).
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Health" to three medical workers who died from serving among the much-
praised legions of "angels in white coats."138 Official media panegyrics
recounted the tales of Liang Shikui, vice-director of a Shanxi hospital emergency
ward who breathed his last while "still wearing his stethoscope," and Chen
Hongguang, the director of a Guangzhou hospital's intensive care unit who died
at his post and willed his corpse for medical research on the illness that killed
him and his patients.139
In addition to such rhetoric, draconian legal and policy measures often
sounded to critical ears like a throwback to an earlier era with elements of
Leninist and quasi-Stalinist characteristics. Even where they did not strikingly
evoke the PRC of the 1950s or 1970s, they represented an approach that differed
fundamentally from the elements in the regime's response to SARS that could
be colorably characterized as "liberal" or promoting transparency and popular
accountability or focusing on public health and healthcare service needs.
By mid-May 2003, more than one hundred people had been arrested in
seventeen provinces, charged with "disturbing social order" (a long-standing
offense under the PRC's criminal law) by "spreading SARS rumors," an action
punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. 140 Some prosecutions focused
on those who spread rumors over the internet, and Beijing's cyber-police
reportedly sharpened their monitoring for SARS related messages and, on the
eve of the April 2003 Politburo meetiqg, were maintaining a ban on the use of
the term SARS in web-postings and messages. Violators risked harassment and
intimidation that surely chilled on-line dissemination of SARS-related
information, both accurate and inaccurate. Over one hundred Falun Gong
followers-the targets of the PRC's suppression campaign against the "heretical
cult" since 1999-and a handful of others as well were arrested for spreading
rumors that "hindered" (in ways the official media report did not specify but that
are assumed to involve rumor-spreading) state efforts to control SARS.141
The potentially broad reach of the notoriously vague State Secrets Law
further undermined any "transparency" agenda by providing a potent factor-
the threat of criminal sanctions for telling some truths-to chill the dissemination
l38. See Susan V. Lawrence, Catching an Invisible Foe, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 8, 2002, at 28
(reporting new public health measures).
139. See Guozhu & Yong, supra note 120 (comparing China's responses to other disasters).
"140. See Bill Savadore, State May Impose Dealh Penalty for Spreading Disease, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 16,2003, at 4 (reporting rules against spread of SARS); Public Security Organs
in Various Localities Uncover Some 150 Cases of Using Atypical Pneumonia to Disrupr Public Order.
Apr. 29. 2003 (reporting number of SARS-related crimes), available at 2003 WL 20178587; Beijing
Goes High Tech to Block .'lARS Messages. NEW ZEALAND HERALD, June 16, 2003 (discussing
censorship efforts). See also China Reporrs Beijing Resident Imprisoned for Spreading SARS. XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, June 11, 2003 (reporting sentencing of man to three years for spreading false
information, via Internet postings, about the SARS situation in Shanghai and the economic effects of
SARS and urging people to hoard food and other items).
141. See Beijing Goes High Tech to BLock .'lARS Messages, supra note 140 (recounting
governmental surveillance); Public Security Organs in Various Localities Uncover Some 150 Cases of
Using Atypical Pneumonia to Disrupt Public Order, supra note 140 (reporting number of arrests).
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of accurate information among the public about SARS.142 The point was
reinforced after the initial SARS crisis had passed when a senior Guangdong
official warned media in his province and neighboring Hong Kong that it was
illegal to report disease information without prior official confirmation. 143
Such threats of possibly severe sanctions did seem to impede greatly the
flow of relevant, true information about SARS, especially-but not only-before
the regime's turn toward a policy of greater transparency in the late spring of
2003. For example, a senior Guangdong official reportedly told Hong Kong's
Health Chief that his government had withheld information about the illness that
was beginning to strike the SAR because information relating to disease
classifications was considered a state secret. Months later, the top public health
official in the home county of the infamous SARS spreader Yue insisted that the
government's new openness policies did not extend to his office. 144
More than the public dissemination of information (false or true) was at
stake. Official media and top officials stressed a broad range of
"responsibilities" that relevant laws, including the Law on the Prevention and
Treatment of Communicable Diseases and the new Regulations on Responding
to Public Health Emergencies, imposed on citizens and stressed the importance
of strict enforcement and firm implementation of those laws. 145
In moves that were presented as merely glosses of existing statutes and
regulations, the Health Ministry issued a sweeping set of "Management
Measures" in May 2003. These imposed strict rules for reporting, quarantine,
isolation, and other matters. The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme
People's Procuracy (as the prosecutor's office is known in the PRC) announced
severe penalties for violating SARS-related regulations. Anyone who knowingly
spread the pathogen could face capital .punishment. Those who broke
quarantine or evaded a mandated medical exam or treatment and accidentally
passed on the illness faced up to seven years in jail. Lesser infractions too could
lead to prolonged incarceration.146
142. The State secrets law was more likely to impede the spreading of accurate information by
government functionaries, for they were, of course, more likely than ordinary citizens to possess
information that fell within the scope of state secrets.
143. See CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT: FREE
FLOW OF INFORMATION (2003) (discussing prior restraints on Chinese press), available at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtuaIAcad/exp/expannrept03.php.
144. See Benitez, supra note 39, at 1 (reporting comments of former Hong Kong health official);
Garrett, supra note 90 (describing health official's refusal to comply with laws and public health
practices). See a/so Bates Gill, China Gnd SARS: Lessons, Implications and Future Steps, Presentation
to the Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) (May 2, 2003),
available at http://www.csis.org/china/030512gill_testimony.pdf.
145. See Premier Hails Victory in Fight Against SARS, supra note 130 (reporting government
efforts); Chinese Health Minister Urges Continuing 'Anti-SARS Spirit,' supra note 115 (reporting
health minister's comments to carry forward the anti-SARS spirit); Chinese Parliament Discusses Vice-
Premier Wu Yi's SARS Report, supra note 123 (reporting group discussions urging further
implementation of measures to check the spread of SARS).
146. See PRC Ministry of Health, Atypical Pneumonia Control Management Measures, May 12,
2003 (describing PRe measures for allowing dissemination of information about SARS), available at
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The bringing of charges against the unfortunate Dr. Li of Inner Mongolia
for knowingly spreading the virus illustrated-to no one's surprise-that the new
powers were not going to lie idle. Worse yet, from a rule-of-Iaw perspective, the
hammer appeared to fall unevenly, with a Dr. Li-like case involving a powerful
village Party functionary (the fugitive Mr. Yue) resulting in so desultory an
approach to investigation and prosecution that the offender was able to escape
long after the facts were known. 147 (More unremarkably, criminal prosecutions
also targeted those who exploited the SARS crisis to commit a variety of
ordinary crimes, primarily varieties of fraud including selling fake drugs or
substandard medical and prevention equipment, claiming to be a SARS victim in
order to avoid paying for goods, or impersonating SARS-control personnel in
order to impose bogus fines. 148)
In the midst of the SARS crisis, official directives warned local and
departmental officials that they would be held strictly responsible for timely and
accurate reporting on SARS and could face up to three-year sentences if they
exhibited insufficient vigilance in combating SARS. More than a hundred state
functionaries, and state health care workers as well, reportedly were fired,
disciplined, or detained for their inefficiency and lassitude amid the shake-up
. that ousted the Health Minister and Beijing's mayor. 149 In the weeks that
.. followed, additional directives warned that any deception or concealment of
relevant statistics would be dealt with severely under applicable laws. Top anti-
SARS official Wu Yi criticized "lax s'upervision" of implementation of public
health laws. 150 Word circulated that leaders of enterprises and other institutions
faced sanctions for SARS outbreaks in their units (which could be expected to be
taken as a sign of the irresponsible handling of SARS leading to heavy economic
losses that carried a possible three year sentence), as well as the clearly
prescribed penalties for failing to report SARS cases. Later, the prosecutions for
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=2231; China Thremens SARS Death Penalry. BBC
NEWS, May 15, 2003 (describing penalties for violating quarantine orders or intentionally spreading
SA RS). available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3030069.st6m: Savadore, supra note
140 (reporting rules against spread of SARS).
147. See Savadore, supra note 140 (reporting Li's arrest); Kahn, Man's Virus Infeers Town, supra
note 90 (reporting the spread of SARS by Dr. Li and his subsequent arrest): Garrett, supra note 90
(noting no charges against Yu).
148. See, e.g., Public Security Organs in Various Localities Uncover Some 150 Cases of Using
Arypical Pneumonia to Disntpr Public Order, supra note 140 (reporting arrests for SARS-related
crimes).
149. See Lawrence, The Plague Reaches Much Deeper, supra note 112, at 26-28 (discussing
governmental accountability): Slack Officials Face Crackdown in SARS Crisis, XtNHUA NEWS
AGENCY, May 7. 2003 (discussing punishment of negligent officials); Garrett, supra note 90
(describing arrests for dereliction of duty); Chinese Health Minisrry Issues Circular on SARS
Prevention. XiNHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 23, 2003 (reporting Ministry of Health notification that
violations of regulations would be punished).
150. See Chinese Health Minisrer Urges Continuing 'Anti-SARS Spirit,' supra note 115 (reporting
health minister's comments to continue anti-SARS spirit). See also Chinese Parliamenr Discusses Vice-
Premier Wu Yi's SARS Report, supra note 123 (reporting National People's Congress group
discussions urging implementation of control measures).
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official diversion and misuse of SARS-fighting funds came as well. 15I
The "authoritarian" or "policing" approach to SARS imposed legal
obligations on citizens and enforcement tasks on Party and state cadres that went
beyond those described above, and beyond what was to prove feasible.
Thousands of Beijing residents were ordered confined at home under orders
enforced by police contingents outside their buildings. Authorities sought to
track down others who had slipped through advancing quarantine nets in some
of Beijing's most heavily affected areas, including the university district of
Haidian. One university website reportedly posted a list of "missing" students
whose whereabouts and prompt return were sought. Officials in the capital
contemplated a blanket quarantine system for members of the huge migrant
population that began to return to the city. Anyone who knowingly left Beijing
infected with SARS was considered in violation of SARS-related legal
prohibitions.
Additional efforts in Beijing focused on expanding rapidly the regime's
capacity to track and monitor potential SARS spreaders through methods that
included: new computer databases; reinvigoration of the hoary neighborhood
residents' committees staffed veteran grassroots Party activists; beefed-up
systems of inspection and registration for immigrants from the countryside and
more affluent travelers arriving and departing by air. 152 Local authorities
elsewhere adopted similar methods and others as well. Nanjing, for example
offered cash rewards for turning in people suspected of having returned from
SARS-affected areas. IS3
As the incipient revisionist history noted above implies, the publicly
expressed official self-perception was one of success in dealing with SARS.
China, after all, relied heavily on establish~d or familiar organs and processes to
cope with SARS, and escaped with relatively little human or direct economic
damage, at least so far. While success might have been attributed largely to luck
(including that SARS has turned out not to be an extremely easily
communicable disease) or to the contributions of the new approaches of
transparency, cooperation, and not-heavily-authoritarian public health
mechanisms, the leadership-or at least an influential segment of it-reached the
conclusion that their long-standing system, including its relatively authoritarian
elements, basically worked. A further inferred lesson appears to have been that,
where the system required changes, much of the necessary tweaking was in an
authoritarian-or at least potentially authoritarian capacity building-direction.
15]. See China Adding Up Medical Costs of SARS Prevention and Treatment, AGENCE FR.
PRESSE, June 18,2003 (summarizing article in PRC paper, Twenty-first Century Economic Daily).
152. See China Steps Up Efforts to Curb SARS, PEOPLE'S DAILY. Apr. 23, 2003 (describing
efforts to contain disease), available at http://english.people.com.cn/200304/23/eng20030423_
115622.shtmJ; Joseph Kahn, Quarantine Set in Beijing Areas to Fight SARS, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,2003,
at Al (discussing measures to quarantine infections in Beijing); Beijing Adopts Computer System to
Track Virus Carriers, PEOPLE'S DAILY, May 6, 2003 (reporting adoption of computer system to track
SARS); Kahn, Heavy-Handed, supra note 108 (discussing use of neighborhood committees in Beijing).
153. See Dolven & Murphy, supra note 129, at 24-26 (describing SARS prevention measures at
the local level).
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Latter-day variants of old-style Maoist and pre-reform-era methods
received a striking share of credit for the success in fighting SARS. The classic
Mao-era elements of ideology, a "correct" Party leadership and dedicated Party
cadres, mass mobilization, and a mobilized, people-serving People's Liberation
Army, were singled out for praise. Hu Jintao identified the "correct guidance of
Deng Xiaoping theory" and Jiang Zemin's "important theory" of the three
represents as among the key reasons for the "major victory" in the "anti-SARS
campaign."154 Wen Jiabao credited the nation's having withstood the "severe
test" of SARS to the dedication of "leading cadres at all levels," as well as
medical workers and the people. 155 Statements by leaders and in the press
routinely stressed the importance of the leadership and guidance of the Chinese
Communist Party, its Central Committee, Politburo, and Standing Committee,
and the State Council in winning the war against SARS.156
An official media account of the fight against SARS offered encomia to the
"combat"-like work that erected a first-class thousand-bed SARS hospital in a
single week, the thousand volunteers who joined in SARS prevention and
control, the more than one thousand PLA doctors who answered the emergency
. call to the nation's capital, and the broader "uniting as one" of the Party, the
,PLA, and the people. 157 The official assessmen t that other "retro" and
authoritarian methods had worked and helped was evident from coverage on,
and demonstrated extensive reliance .upon, such means as polemical patriotic
exhortations to the masses, activist-led neighborhood-level residents'
committees, selective stern discipline of wayward or ineffective officials and
functionaries, and reliance on harsh sanctions and vast contingents of police,
military, and other public safety and security personnel to monitor and secure
transportation hubs, urban perimeters, and quarantined blocks-deserve much
of the credit for containing SARS. i58
Skeptical outside observers could discern a lack of appetite for significant
reform in the appointments of Wu Yi to manage the SARS portfolio and, to a
lesser degree, Wang Qishan as the Mayor of SARS-stricken Beijing. While their
selection could suggest an emphasis on competence and openness, it could also
sound like echoes of three venerable practices: deploying skilled "barbarian
handlers" to sooths foreigners' outrage and blunt their demands; blaming
154. See Chinese President fIu .1intao Hails Success of Anti-SARS Drive, supra note 138 (quoting
Hui Jintao).
155. Premier Hails Victory in Fight Against SARS, supra note 130 (quoting president's speech
.outlining China's efforts in containing SARS).
156. See Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao Attends Conference Summarizing Fighe Against SARS,
Financial Times Information, Jul. 18, 2003 (reporting comments from an interim summary
conference), available ae LEXIS, Newsfile Library, Global News Wire File; Guozhu & Yong, supra
note 120 (comparing China's response to other disasters). See also supra note 131 and accompanying
text (discussing revisionist history version of China's response to SARS as completely successful).
157. Guozhu & Yong, supra note 120 (comparing China's responses to various disasters in
history).
158. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing other crisis containment responses
used by China).
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institutional or systemic flaws on the individual shortcomings and poor
performance of second-tier officials who did not enjoy sufficient top-level
patronage to protect them; and turning in a crisis to tough and trusted officials
who have demonstrated ability to root out bureaucratic weakness or corruption,
maintain social order in challenging circumstances, and thereby save a basically
authoritarian system from its own weaknesses.
SARS-related and SARS crisis-inspired proposals for legal reforms often
coupled their relatively "liberal" features with an at least equal admixture of
provisions of a very different cast. The planned Emergency Law reportedly
would incorporate authoritarian and potentially repressive strands in the old
Martial Law and National Defense Law, spawning concerns that an Emergency
Law with those characteristics would remain badly ill-suited to deal with public
health emergencies and their special need for an emphasis on transparency and
treatment. The SARS-prompted Regulations on Responding to Public Health
Emergencies and proposed amendments to the 1989 Law on the Prevention and
Control of Contagious Diseases similarly contemplated significant sanctions and
reporting obligations not only for government entities but also for "social
organizations" such as the media and universities. Expansive quarantine powers
were to be retained as well, despite criticisms (including from the perspective of
public health professionals whose influence supposedly had risen amid the SARS
crisis) that such methods were archaic, and despite ample evidence that they had
not worked very well during the 2002-2003 outbreak.
Ideas of amending the State Secrets Law to eliminate the risk of prosecution
for the disclosure of true information about SARS, other infectious diseases, or
public health problems made little headway. Legal authority to control such
information apparently will remain veste~ for the foreseeable future in the
"responsible" government department (primarily the Ministry of Health). There
has been no significant public discussion of amending the criminal law to alter
the provision (apparently not used during the 2002-2003 SARS episode) that
permits criminal punishment of government functionaries who are negligent in
handling public health matters.l59 Rather, the gist of many of the legal changes
adopted in response to SARS would seem to provide new reasons and basis for
authorities' making use of the relevant criminal law provisions.
The agenda of SARS-related institutional reforms-some of which were at
stake in the discussion of reforms to public health laws and related laws-has
focused on measures that could strengthen the tools of authoritarian responses
to public health crises and a range of other social and political developments.
Some of the changes proposed and partially undertaken include increasing the
professional capacity, institutional resources, internal discipline, and
administrative powers of established bureaucratic institutions such as the
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Statistics, and the public security organs. In
practice or by design, such institutions tend to be more toward the authoritarian
end of the spectrum, compared to other possible and, in some cases, actual
159. See CRIMINAL LAW OF THE PRC, art. 409 (allowing imprisonment for public health officials
whose negligence results in the spread of infectious disease).
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beneficiaries of SARS-related bureaucratic reshufflings. The Chinese Center for
Disease Control, seen within China and abroad as relatively inclined toward a
more transparent and treatment/prevention-focused approach, has not yet
experienced the rise in status and bureaucratic clout (including, for example,
promotion to "cabinet" status) that some proponents of reform had hoped or
anticipated.
Much of the SARS-inspired agenda of institutional change has focused on
the institution-building tasks of strengthening the center's authority at the local
level (and over local authorities), and on building the institutional capacity of
relevant local government institutions. The SARS problem provided ample
evidence for the position that local governments needed to be made stronger and
more accountable to the center. From this point of view, more capable,
disciplined, and vertically integrated institutions are an answer for the dangers
. posed by grassroots institutions that were obviously ill-equipped to cope with a
SA..RS plague that thankfully has not yet come.
The latitude that local officials felt they had, and clearly used, to cover up
·initial outbreaks was recognized as a serious deficiency that needed to be
·addressed through new requirements of reporting to higher level authorities,
·sharpened sanctions against local officials guilty of concealment, and so on. The
principal impediment to a more unequivocally centralized approach to public
health administration (including monitQring and reporting of disease outbreaks)
appears to have been a concern that the relevant central authorities, even if
empowered by formal legal changes and clear policy imperatives, still might lack
the requisite clout or connections with local authorities to extract the
information or uncover the facts any better than the old, failed system had in
2002-2003. Whatever its effects might have been on containing the spread of
SARS, there was much that alarmed the central leadership in many local
government authorities' undertaking or collaborating in SARS-inspired do-it-
yourself-Balkanization by roadblock-building. Such actions lacked central
authorization, undercut the center's policies, and suggested a crisis in governance
·that the leadership did not want to concede or occur. Much the same can be said
about the implications of, and the public security forces' response to, violent
local resistance to the construction of SARS quarantine or treatment facilities.16o
The other, related element of the agenda for reforming local government
institutions focused on strengthening those entities' ability to cope with public
health needs, future public health emergencies, and other tasks. On this front,
SARS was a wake-up call about the frayed structure of basic-level health care,
the need for SARS or other serious communicable disease hospital facilities, and
the lack of adequate organizational capacity to institute monitoring, quarantine,
and other procedures to contain a SARS or SARS-like outbreak. Pledges or
political and real capital to address these problems were legion in the aftermath
of SARS. And the package of prescribed measures, if fully implemented, would
provide, de facto or by design, tools that could or would serve nicely for an
160. See, e.g., Police and Chinese Villagers Come to Blows in Violent Clash. AGENCE FR. PRESSE,
Aug. 9,2003 (reporting violence and arrests in southern Chinese village).
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authoritarian approach to a new health emergency.
Some of the more authoritarian-seeming or authoritarian-compatible moves
by the PRC during and after the SARS crisis resemble, at least on the surface,
those adopted in heavily SARS-hit cities beyond the mainland Chinese area.
Taiwan instituted tight screening and mandatory quarantine measures and
adopted laws permitting strict penalties for quarantine violators and others who
hindered the battle against SARS by concealing medical histories or hoarding
needed supplies. Hong Kong legislators called for, and the legislature passed,
more expansive quarantine powers.161 But seemingly similar measures adopted
by the PRC were uniquely alarming to potential targets and observers, for
several reasons. They were coupled with the more obviously harsh and.
campaign-like SARS-era measures described above. They also unfolded against
the background of a long history of severe and arbitrary uses of seemingly
ordinary governmental powers in the PRe.
Critics warned that the PRC's legal and policy initiatives created potentially
perverse incentives that could undermine the fight against SARS.162 Fearing bad
outcomes either way, citizens and officials might well take the "double or
nothing" bet and avoid seeking treatment, fulfilling their reporting obligations,
or submitting to quarantine or other travel restrictions. From this perspective,
there loomed a risk of a spiral of distrust, incapacity, and coercion that could
overwhelm the more open and cooperative strategy embraced by Hu, Wen, and
the April Politburo meeting. Much of the available account of the cycle of public
and regime responses to SARS is compatible with such a pattern: popular
distrust in the authorities' honesty and competence made evasion of the
obligations it imposed and the orders it issued seem rational and feasible. Faced
with expected evasion, authorities predict,!-bly may be tempted-as the PRC
regime so often seems to have been-to resort to harsh sanctions imposed in a
well-publicized way against the relatively few who are caught, even for minor
transgressions, to deter others and prevent the unraveling effect that a low
probability of detection invites. With officials functionaries demonstrably
unable to make their far-reaching orders (for quarantine, reporting, or even
foregoing the construction of roadblocks stick), the perception of the limits to
161. See Taiwan Civet Cats Tested by CGA Free from SA RS Virus, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 7, 2004
(describing procedures); Taiwan Legislature Adopts Proposal to Tighten SARS Rules, June 6, 2003
(reporting adoption of stricter revisions to SARS laws), available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, BBC
World Monitoring File; Premier Says Taiwan Government Commiued to Containing SARS, Apr. 27,
2003 (reporting comments by president), available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, BBC Worldwide
Monitoring File; Taiwan Presidem Calls for Unity in Fight Against SARS, May 5, 2003 (reporting
president's comments to punish quarantine-breakers), available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, BBe
Worldwide Monitoring File; Taiwan Minister Warns of Tough Action Against Violators of Ami-SARS
Measures. May 4, 2003 (reporting minister's warning that violations of quarantine regulations will be
punished), available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, BBC Worldwide Monitoring File; Bird Flu - Hong
Kong Purs Virus on Danger List, Jan. 30,2004 (describing post-SARS amendment to quarantine law),
available at LEXIS, Newsfile Library, AFX (Asia) File. See generally Sapsin et a1., supra note 83
(discussing global legal preparedness in response to public health emergencies); H. K. Slams
Guangdong, supra note 59 (calling for tougher laws to prevent recurrence of disease).
162. See Savadore, supra note 140 (discussing rules for reporting SARS).
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state capacity to see its will followed, and more broadly to handle a crisis and its
origins, is reinforced.
Moreover, the foundations of the more "liberal" or "pro-accountability" or
"pro-transparency" or "less authoritarian" approach showed signs of significant
weakness in China, compared to the foundations of such elements elsewhere,
and compared to the signs of strength in China of the foundations for the more
authoritarian line.
Chinese elite factional politics is an unstable and murky business and any
political victory that may have lain behind the relatively liberal but mixed
approach to SARS that emerged in April 2003-or policies of openness and
responsiveness more generally-was neither complete nor irreversible.
Watchers of elite politics who saw bold and successful moves by Hu and Wen
also noted that there was another dimension to this part of the story that offered
much less support for an argument that some significant reorientation might be
occurring. The real power-holder in the Beijing city hierarchy, Party Secretary
and Jiang Zemin associate Liu Qi, escaped with minor scrapes while Hu's ally
Mayor Meng Xuenong was ousted. Another close Jiang supporter, Politburo
Standing Committee member Li Changchun, was spared serious criticism despite
;his position as then-recently appointed overseer of the cover-up-prone media
.and his immediate prior post as Party Secretary of Guangdong during the period
when SARS was erupting in that proyince of its apparent origin. Few expert
observers of Chinese elite politics doubted that Jiang's acquiescence, if not his
prior blessing, was required for Hu and Wen's moves, while some speculated
that Jiang may have been testing his nominal successor or even setting him up to
fail. 163
The more revanchist aspects of the Chinese regime's handling of the SARS
issue cannot be dismissed as fading legacies. Perceived threats to economic or
public health can push any regime toward illiberal and defensive responses,
whether in the form of cover-ups or heavy-handed legal and administrative
measures to ameliorate the danger. Contemporary China was particularly
susceptible to such a response when confronted with the threat that SARS
appeared to pose. A serious economic downturn due to the spread of SARS, or
the fear of SARS, would threaten the pillar on which the CCP has largely staked
its claim to power for a generation. The prospect of significant SARS-spawned
impediments to the movement of goods and people-ranging from fear of travel
to transportation-slowing screening measures to quarantines to the notorious
spontaneous local roadblocks-portended additional economic losses.
Any such creeping balkanization also evoked the chronic problem of
"excessive" decentralization that has worried the Chinese leadership throughout
the reform era, in part because it conjures up the political fragmentation of the
warlord era that the Chinese Communist regime prides itself on overcoming.
The equally alarming specter of social unrest-always haunting to a Party that
took the restoration of internal order as a founding accomplishment and that had
163. [d.
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been badly damaged by the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution-did not loom all
that large in the SARS crisis. But it did lurk. A SARS-induced setback to
prosperity or a SARS epidemic sickening millions could well look like the
regime's failure to fulfill its basic missions of providing an economy that
generates rising affluence and a government that secures its subjects' physical
safety. The riots in areas where rumors (or true stories) told of government
plans to establish SARS wards, and the moves by local governments to establish
unauthorized roadblocks and checkpoints, gave a taste of what might come if the
efforts failed to bring the illness under control and repair the regime's
credibility. 1M In such a setting, aggressive, repressive, and quasi-military
methods can hold considerable appeal for besieged ruling elites.
The impetus to a more closed and repressive approach to SARS and
kindred threats to order and stability also could be especially persuasive with
respect to China's hinterland, its less cosmopolitan cities, and perhaps its rural-
based urban migrant and transient population. The constituencies for-and
expectations and experiences of-liberal reform are thinnest there. There also,
the lack of medical and public health facilities and government institutional
capacities may leave few alternatives to a more martial law-like approach,
especially when unrest or resistance to centrally mandated measures erupts.
More broadly, modest rhetoric about attending to reform's losers has yet to
generate a significant shift of ideological emphasis, much less action and
resources. Despite the flirtation with "going west," the Jiang Zemin-era
leadership ultimately remained closely associated with the "coastal strategy" that
emerged during the Deng Xiaoping years and solidified his commitment to that
approach with his valedictory doctrine of the "three represents," by which the
Party has unprecedentedly opened its doors and offered its embrace to China's
largely urban and coastal entrepreneurial siratum. Hu's nominal succession to
Jiang's post brought no backpedaling on this key element of Jiang Zemin
theory. 165 SARS has not been sufficient to transform these features of the
political landscape and, indeed, some of the harder and harsher aspects of the
regime's response are fully in keeping with them.
164. See Erik Eckholm, SARS is the Spark for a Riot in China, NY. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at 1
(reporting riots at quarantine facilities); Dolven & Murphy, supra note 129, at 24-26 (discussing
quarantine, roadblocks, and blockades).
165. See CPC to Launch New Round of Study of 'Three Represents' Theory, PEOPLE'S DAILY,
Apr. 28, 2003 (discussing impact of party-building theory), available at http://english.people.com.cn/
200304/28/eng20030428~115958.shtml.
